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OPPORTUNITY-COST CONFLICTS IN

CORPORATE LAW
Abraham J.B. Cablet
ABSTRACT

Delaware corporate law has a new brand of loyalty claim: the
opportunity-cost conflict. Such a conflict arises when a fiduciary
operates under strong incentives to withdraw human and financial
capital for redeployment into new investment opportunities. The
concept has its roots in venture capital investing, where board members
affiliated with venture capital funds may have incentives to shut down
viable start-ups in order to focus on more promising companies.
Recognizing this type of conflict has conceptual value-it provides
a coherent framework for assessing a fiduciary's incentives, and it may
help explain frequently criticized features of corporate fiduciary law.
But this article argues that courts should invoke the doctrine sparingly
to avoid upsetting the law's current balance between policing
managerial abuse and litigation abuse.
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INTRODUCTION

Assume you establish a corporation to operate a restaurant, and
you are lucky enough to know Warren Buffet and Bill Gates.' Imagine
that (a) Buffet and Gates each loan the corporation $500,000 at a
reasonable interest rate; (b) Buffet and Gates serve as officers and
directors of the corporation; and (c) Buffet and Gates each receive 25.5
percent of the corporation's common stock as compensation for their
service and advice. Assume the restaurant operates for five years with
moderate success-enough to make the loan payments with only a small
amount left over for shareholders. Now suppose you propose a new
menu to boost profits, but Gates and Buffet decide their time and
money could be put to better use elsewhere. They vote as board
members to sell the restaurant for an amount that pays off the loans
but leaves only a small amount for shareholders. Assuming Gates and
Buffet obtained a good price for the restaurant at that time, have they
violated their fiduciary duties to you because they turned their
attention to other projects and denied you the chance to unveil your
new menu?
The Delaware Chancery Court recently suggested that the answer
is yes by recognizing for the first time what this article refers to as an
"opportunity-cost conflict." This article argues that this novel fiduciary
1.

For an entertaining account of the Buffet and Gates friendship, see Drake
Baer, How Bill Gates And Warren Buffett Overcame A Totally Awkward
FirstMeeting To Become Best Friends,BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:15
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-warren-buffett-friendship2014-10 [http://perma.cc/87UD-ZT7X].
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principle is a double-edged sword: conceptually valuable but difficult to
enforce without unsettling the law of corporate fiduciaries.
An opportunity-cost conflict arises when corporate fiduciaries
operate under strong incentives to withdraw human and financial capital for redeployment into new investment opportunities. This concept
is rooted in the economic principle of opportunity cost-the cost of a
course of action is the highest value alternative forsaken.' It recognizes
that a true understanding of a fiduciary's incentives requires knowing
the fiduciary's alternatives to continued dealings with the beneficiary.
Opportunity-cost conflicts are distinct from traditional duty of
loyalty claims against corporate fiduciaries. Traditionally, such claims
arise in two principal situations: (1) self-dealing between the fiduciary
and the corporation to the detriment of the latter3 and (2) misappropriation by the fiduciary of a corporate opportunity.4 Unlike traditional
self-dealing, a fiduciary with an opportunity-cost conflict does not enter
into a transaction with the corporation-the fiduciary simply shuts
down the business and withdraws. Unlike a fiduciary who misappropriates a corporate opportunity, a fiduciary with an opportunity-cost
conflict does not pursue any business initiative that rightfully belongs
to the corporation-the fiduciary simply abandons one corporation in
order to focus on a more promising alternative.
Not surprisingly, the concept of opportunity-cost conflicts was born
in the context of venture capital investing. Venture capital funds take
an unusually active role in the start-ups in which they invest.' This
hands-on approach requires venture capitalists to allocate their scarce
time among portfolio companies.' In this setting, continued investment
in a moderately promising start-up company may have a high opportunity cost for the venture capitalist because it comes at the expense of
spending additional time on more promising companies in the fund's
2.

A common illustration of the concept is that there is "no free lunch" because
time is scarce and attending lunch forecloses alternative uses of time. E.g.,
Russell Roberts, Getting the Most Out of Life: The Concept of Opportunity
Cost,

LIBRARY

OF

ECONOMICS

AND

LIBERTY

(Feb.

5,

2007),

http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Robertsopportunitycost.
html [http://perma.cc/T8HM-2FHH] (discussing the proverbial free lunch).
3.

See infra notes 33 and 175 (discussing claims based on self-dealing by a
corporate director).

4.

E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (imposing special

procedural requirements on the pursuit of a business opportunity belonging to

the corporation); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996)
(applying the corporate opportunities doctrine under Delaware law).
5.

See infra text accompanying notes 107-109 (discussing the active role that
funds play in management decisions, and the decisions they face in
allocating their time).

6.

See id. (discussing the limited time resources of venture capital funds).
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portfolio.7 Indeed, commentators have long observed that venture
capital funds may shut down viable companies in circumstances where
company founders might prefer to forge ahead.8 One can anticipate
similar dynamics in any setting where active investors must allocate
their efforts among competing projects. 9
In the recent case of In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder
0
(Trados), the Delaware Chancery Court expressly invoked
Litigation"
this shutdown dynamic while enshrining opportunity-cost conflicts into
law. 1 The court held that start-up company board members affiliated
with venture capital funds faced a conflict of interest when considering
a merger that resulted in a payout to the funds, as preferred shareholders, but no payout to common shareholders.' 2 Though an earlier
opinion in the Trados litigation (Pretrial Trados) received significant
scholarly attention for allowing such a claim to survive a motion to
dismiss, 4 only the most recent opinion, which has received less
attention from scholars, fully articulates the court's novel reasoning. 5
7.

See id.

8.

See id.

9.

See infra text accompanying notes 113-114 (citing as possible examples:
shareholders in a closely held corporation, activist hedge-fund investors,
and parent corporations).

10.

73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).

11.

Id. at 46-54.

12.

See id. at 54 ("[Three directors] were not independent with respect to the
Merger. They wanted to exit, consistent with the interests of the VC firms
they represented.").

13.

In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del.
Ch. July 24, 2009).

14.

E.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred
Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1874-1900 (2013) (discussing Pretrial
Trados in articulating an over-arching "theory of preferred stock");
Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L.
REV. 1163, 1165, 1185-89 (2013) (discussing Pretrial Trados as a basis
for "reassess[ing] the law's treatment of preferred stockholders in the
venture capital context"); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom:
The Case of Constituency Directors,91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 314 n.12,
320 (2013) (discussing Pretrial Trados in an economic analysis of
constituency directors); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently
Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2039 (2013) (discussing
Pretrial Trados in a response to Bratton and Wachter).

15.

The trial court opinion has been cited in a handful of law review articles.
Most notably, several prominent authors discussed the opinion in a recent
symposium issue of the Seattle University Law Review. See Robert P.
Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End,
38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 290-95 (2015); Margaret Blair, Boards of
Directors as Mediating Hierarchs,38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 297, 330-34 (2015);
Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of "Team"
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Conceptually, Trados deserves credit for giving courts a coherent
framework for identifying when a fiduciary's incentives are in fact
impaired. Though courts and commentators have long recognized that
disparate payouts from a transaction can affect incentives, 6 Trados
reminds us that such cash flow rights are only part of the story. In the
restaurant example above, Gates and Buffet may not have precisely the
same financial incentives as you because only they receive a significant
payout from transaction (repayment of their loans). But those payout
differentials alone do not really answer the question of whether Gates
and Buffet have materially different incentives than you. After all, they
are also shareholders who would benefit from a wildly successful new
menu, and they continue to receive interest payments on the loans as
long as they are outstanding. What really puts you at odds with Buffet
and Gates are their lucrative alternatives to your more pedestrian
venture.
Another conceptual strength of Trados's new analysis is the light
it sheds on contested normative questions regarding fiduciary duties,
such as the vexing question of to whom director fiduciary duties should
be owed. After deciding that the preferred and common shareholders in
Trados had conflicting interests, the court determined that the board
owed its fiduciary duty to the common shareholders alone (common
maximization)-" Prominent commentators have instead argued that
corporate directors should seek to maximize overall enterprise value
(enterprise maximization) rather than common stock value alone,
because a rule of enterprise maximization increases combined welfare.",
Focusing on opportunity costs may inform this debate and explain the
court's choice of common maximization. For example, it is not clear
that enterprise maximization is the right measure of combined welfare
if it ignores gains from redeploying capital and effort to more promising

Production of Corporate Governance, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 365, 383-86
(2015); Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company
Boards, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 619, 627-36 (2015). But these authors did not
focus on the opportunity-cost reasoning that this article analyzes.
16.

See infra Part L.A (describing the relationship between incentive
incompatibility and fiduciary duties).

17.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 42 n.16 ("As long as a board complies with its
legal obligations, the standard of fiduciary conduct calls for the board to
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of the common stock.").

18.

See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1309, 1323-28 (2008) ("[Ijndeed coupling firm-maximization with a
broad business judgment rule may in fact be a sensible way to think about the
problem...."); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1894 ("An
enterprise value-maximization principle presents a much stronger case for
fiduciary scrutiny with a more balanced tradeoff of costs and benefits.").

66 • ISSUE 1 • 2015
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in CorporateLaw

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW - VOLUME

opportunities.19 Moreover, if venture capital investors labor under
pervasive opportunity-cost conflicts, a rule of common maximization
may be necessary to induce entrepreneurs to fully commit to corporate
ventures.2 0
Despite these conceptual strengths, this article concludes that
courts should interpret the doctrine of opportunity-cost conflicts
narrowly. In Delaware corporate law, access to judicial process is
conditioned on clear indicia of misconduct. This feature of fiduciary
law seems to reflect a considered judgment that the societal cost of
allowing meritless litigation to proceed exceeds the societal cost of
letting some fiduciary indiscretions go unlitigated 2 Because opportunity-cost conflicts are nuanced, multilayered, and ubiquitous, allowing liberal pursuit of such claims would upset the law's current balance
between policing litigation abuse and managerial misconduct. Thus,
Trados serves as an example of how doctrine can be both "right" and
impractical to implement except for in the most egregious cases.
This replays a familiar dynamic in corporate law. Corporate law
sometimes maintains lofty standards of conduct (what we ideally expect
of a fiduciary) while evaluating individual cases under deferential standards of review (such as the business judgment rule) that decline
rigorous judicial enforcement.2 4 In other words, a court may announce
an important principle based on unusually vivid evidence in a particular
case, but the principle may not be worth actively policing in the ordinary case. A well-known example is the famous dispute between Henry
Ford and shareholders of Ford Motor Company in which shareholders
objected to Ford's expansion plans and curtailment of dividends on the
basis that he was operating the company based on social rather than

19.

See infra Part II.B.1 (suggesting the rule of enterprise value is too atomistic).

20.

See infra Part II.B.2 (suggesting a plausible explanation for why a rule of
common maximization is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to enter into
venture capital bargains).

21.

See infra Part III.A (discussing how standard of review in Delaware reserves
judicial process for those instances in which the court's interest in policing
managerial misconduct outweighs its interest in policing litigation abuse).

22.

See infra Part III.A (providing an overview of empirical research and
commentary regarding strike suits in shareholder litigation).

23.

See infra Part II.A (identifying the many layers of information necessary
to understand a party's opportunity costs); infra Part III (arguing that
opportunity cost conflicts are ubiquitous in the sense that investors will
frequently have better options (regrets) and therefore an incentive to
redeploy capital and efforts into new projects).

24.

See infra text accompanying note 173 (discussing diverging standards of
review and standards of conduct).
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financial goals.2" Ford lost the case because he stubbornly insisted that
he operated the company without regard to earning profits for
shareholders.26 Although the case remains good law and does conceptual
work in the classroom (where it frequently introduces students to the
corporate law norm of shareholder primacy), 27 courts have generally
declined to enforce the principle vigorously. 21 Likewise, Trados is an
important case, but one that should be invoked sparingly.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the importance
of incentive structures in fiduciary law, the conceptual difficulties posed
by the incentive structures of venture capital investors, and Trados's
approach to addressing those difficulties. Part II identifies conceptual
strengths in the court's framework of opportunity-cost conflicts,
includeing its sound footing in models of economic decision-making and
its implications for normative debate about the form and content of
corporate fiduciary duties. Having acknowledged these strengths, this
article advocates in Part III for a narrow reading of the case based on
concerns that litigation is an inefficient mechanism for enforcing the
duties Trados defines. Part IV anticipates and responds to potential
objections.

I. A

NOVEL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
QUASI-RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS

This Part frames the problem that Trados sought to solve. In short,
holders of traditional preferred stock have materially different
incentives than holders of common stock, which may call into question
whether a fiduciary associated with a preferred holder will discharge
duties owed to common holders. But venture capital investors do not
receive traditional preferred stock, making it difficult to discern their
incentives. Trados offers a solution to this incentive ambiguity.

25.
26.

27.

See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (quoting
testimony of Henry Ford).
See id. at 684 ("A business corporation is organized and carried on

primarily for the profit of the stockholders.").
See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.

277, 315 (1998) (describing the case as "[t]he most quoted-at least by

academics-statement of the shareholder primacy norm" and noting its
prevalence in law school curriculums).

28.

See id. at 286-88 (asserting that the business judgment rule makes the
shareholder primacy norm "virtually unenforceable" in the context of
publicly traded companies). Smith argues that the shareholder primacy
norm evolved into the modern doctrine of minority oppression in the
context of privately held corporations. Id. at 279.
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A. Loyalty and Incentive Incompatibility

The fiduciary duty of loyalty can be thought of as a collection of
component obligations, each being more or less relevant in a particular
context. Examples of such component obligations include: honesty and
full disclosure to the beneficiary29 ("honesty"), using the beneficiary's
property only for the benefit of the beneficiary rather than the
fiduciary" ("no misappropriation"), and giving the expected amount of
effort in advancing the beneficiary's interests31 ("full effort"). These
obligations may sound in moral or economic theory.32 In corporate law,
courts enforce the duty of loyalty by more intensely policing fact patterns that seem likely to implicate one or more of the component loyalty
obligations. For example, courts apply the exacting fairness standard,
instead of the deferential business judgment rule, whenever a corporate
director engages in self-dealing by entering into a contract with the
33
corporation.

29.

See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 180-81 (Andrew

S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW] (discussing situations in which loyalty includes an
obligation of "being true").
FIDUCIARY

30.

E.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) (requiring a partner to
"account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit,
or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the
partnership business"). Gordon Smith describes the core obligation of loyalty
in similar terms but uses the expanded concept of a "critical resource"
instead of property. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of
Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1407 (2002) ("[A] wrong is
committed in the fiduciary context when the fiduciary does or has something
that is inconsistent with the beneficiary's interest in the critical resource.").

31.

See FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supranote 29, at 179-80 (discussing
situations in which loyalty includes an obligation of "affirmative devotion");
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discoursein Corporate
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 37-42 (2003) (identifying a notion of loyalty
requiring the fiduciary to affirmatively advance the beneficiary's interests);
Sepe, supra note 14, at 319 (discussing the economic concept of "insufficient
effort" and relating the concept to fiduciary duty law).

32.

See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 889-92 (1988) (discussing the disconnect
between traditional law and economics analyses of fiduciary duties and
the moral tone of judicial opinions delineating these rights).

33.

See MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (requiring that
a "director's conflicting interest transaction" (1) be approved by independent
directors or shareholders or (2) be fair to the corporation); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144 (2015) (requiring that a self-dealing transaction be fair to the
corporation or subject to special approval procedures).
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In some circumstances, it is difficult to identify precisely why a
particular claim lies in loyalty rather than the duty of care. 4 On the
one hand, betrayal by a fiduciary through misappropriation or
deception clearly enough offends ethical or moral sensibilities. Perhaps,
not surprisingly then, the obligations of honesty and no misappropriation likely form the core of the duty of loyalty. 5 In contrast, the
obligation of full effort has been less prominent in loyalty jurisprudence,
perhaps because offending conduct resembles a less culpable negligence
claim. 6 In some cases, a fact pattern implicates loyalty only as a matter
of degree-consequences of impaired effort are particularly severe in a
particular setting," conduct is particularly egregious or intentional,"
lapses are particularly likely because incentive structures are noticeably
impaired,39 or violations are particularly easy to police because they are
easy to identify.4

34.

See Johnson, supra note 31, at 37-42 (discussing overlap between care
and loyalty concepts); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 103
(1991) ("[Tlhere is no sharp line between the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. What is the difference between working less hard than
promised at a given level of compensation (a breach of the duty of
care) and being compensated more than promised at a given level of
work (a breach of the duty of loyalty)?").

35.

See Johnson, supra note 31, at 37-42 (discussing a minimum condition of
loyalty (non-betrayal) and a "maximum condition" of loyalty (affirmatively
advancing the beneficiary's interests)).

36.

See id. Prior to the court's decision in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A. 2d 362 (Del.
2006), it may not have been clear under Delaware law that extreme nonfeasance constitutes a breach of loyalty rather than care or a separate
duty of good faith. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.

37.

For example, Delaware courts may scrutinize sale transactions that
constitute an "end-game" for shareholders. See In re Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15 (Del. Ch. May
20, 2011) (explaining circumstances triggering scrutiny under the Revlon
standard). In extreme cases, a failure to obtain the best price for shareholders in such a transaction constitutes a duty of loyalty claim. See
Stephen Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3277, 3314-3320 (2013) (discussing circumstances in which Revlon
claims implicate the duty of loyalty).

38.

E.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70 (holding that insufficient director
oversight might constitute a breach of loyalty in cases of "utter failure"
or "conscious disregard").

39.

See infra notes 41-50 (discussing impaired incentives in the context of
self-dealing and capital structures with fixed and residual claimants).

40.

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 103 ("It is . .. easier for
courts to detect appropriations than to detect negligence, so the costs of
inquiry and error are lower.").
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For example, courts might closely police self-dealing because it
severely impairs a director's incentives to give full effort in protecting
the corporation's interests with respect to the subject matter of the selfdealing.41 Though a fiduciary may act benevolently towards his or her
beneficiary in such a situation, a self-dealing transaction has an
undeniable distributional aspect. With respect to many basic terms of
a transaction-price, for example-the fiduciary's gain will be the
corporation's loss.42 When a director engages in self-dealing, he or she
does not necessarily violate his or her fiduciary duty. But experience
warns that breaches are more likely than in the case of an arms-length
bargain, and so corporate law places a high burden on the director to
43
establish that he or she remained loyal.
Self-dealing is only one example of impaired incentives giving rise
to loyalty claims. For instance, legal scholars have given significant
attention to a fact pattern that William Bratton and Michael Wachter
refer to as the "moderate downside."4 4 When a corporation is neither

41.

See FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 29, at 178 (discussing the
proposition that anti-conflict rules are a prophylactic device to ensure full
affirmative devotion); William T. Allen, et. al., Function Over Form: A
Reasonable Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware CorporateLaw,
56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1302 (2001) ("[W]here a majority (of the board] have
personal interests in the transaction that are adverse to the interest of the
shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to
achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit."). One could also
view self-dealing as a violation of the no-misappropriation obligation to the
extent the fiduciary misappropriates value through a one-sided transaction.

42.

In an arms-length transaction without fraud or duress, one can assume that
exchange transactions are mutually beneficial at some level (or they would
not occur). See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining,
85 GEO. L.J. 369, 373-90 (1996) (discussing the mutually beneficial aspects
of exchange transactions). One cannot make that same assumption when a
conflicted fiduciary sits on both sides of the deal. Moreover, even in a
mutually beneficial transaction, there are many distributional aspects that
a self-dealing fiduciary may tilt to his or her advantage. Id.

43.

See FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 29, at 184 ("The anticonflicts rules are sometimes taken to be protective of fiduciary loyalty,
rather than an example of fiduciary loyalty itself.").

44.

Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1874-75, 1885-87 (using the
terminology "moderate downside"). See also Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor,
Agency Costs of Venture CapitalistControl in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
967, 994-97 (2006) (describing incentive distortions that may occur when
"the firm is neither a complete failure nor a stunning success"); Baird &
Henderson, supra note 18, at 1329-33 (providing an example based on the
case of Orban v. Field and making comparisons to zone of insolvency cases);
Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1186-89 (discussing the Trados fact pattern).
Simone Sepe uses game theoretical examples that depict what one might
call the moderate downside, but with a fuller range of potential actions and
outcomes than in Hypothetical A below. Sepe, supra note 14, at 351-55.
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wildly successful nor hopelessly insolvent, conflicts can arise between
common stock holders, as residual claimants, and a corporation's fixed
claimants. 45 Fixed claimants include parties with discrete claims on the
corporation's assets or cash flow, such as lenders with the right to loan
repayment, trade creditors with the right to payment for goods and
services, employees with the right to salary and other cash compensation, and traditional preferred stock holders entitled to receive a
stated periodic dividend and payout at liquidation. 46 In contrast,
residual claimants such as common stock holders (1) receive financial
benefit from the corporation only after payment of fixed claims and (2)
enjoy unlimited participation in a company's "upside" value in excess
of fixed claims.47
At the moderate downside, a fixed claimant may want the
corporation to act conservatively in order to ensure satisfaction of fixed
obligations while residual claimants may favor riskier strategies with
greater upside potential. 48 Bratton and Wachter illustrate these incent49
ives through a hypothetical similar to the following:

45.

See Sepe, supra note 14, at 312-15 (discussing potential conflicts).

46.

See id. at 314 n.12, 320 (listing payments owed to creditors, dividends
owed to preferred shareholders, and wages owed to employees as examples
of fixed claims).

47.

See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 34, at 67 ("[S]hareholders are
the residual claimants to the firm's income.... The gains and losses from
abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose
claims stand last in line."); Sepe, supra note 14, at 313 (describing the
rights of common shareholders as residual claimants).

48.

See Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at 972-95 (stating that holders with
fixed claims "sometimes gain less from increases in firm value than they lose
from decreases in firm value" resulting in fixed claimants choosing "lowerrisk, lower-value investment strategies over higher-risk, higher-value
investment strategies"). More generally, incentive incompatibility between
debt and equity is a common theme in corporate finance literature. E.g.,
Lucian Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy, 57 J. OF FIN. 445, 447 (2002) ("Equityholders (and managers
seeking to maximize the value of equity) might favor a risky project over a
safer one even if the risky project offers a somewhat lower expected return,
because the returns from favorable outcomes of the risky project would be
captured by the equity holders, whereas the losses from its unfavorable
outcomes would be partly borne by the debtholders."); Robert E. Scott,
The Truth About Secured Lending, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1449 (1997)
("If the project succeeds, the equity interests capture all the gains, but if
the project fails, the losses are shared with the debtholders. The debt
cushion, in other words, can lead to excessively risky investments.").

49.

E.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1886 (including a similar example
with a preferred stockholder as fixed claimant). I have used a creditor rather
than a preferred stockholder in this example because I delay my explanation
of preferred stock terms to the next subsection. Moreover, those who have
illustrated the moderate-downside fact pattern through preferred-stock
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Hypothetical A: Purely Fixed and Purely Residual Claimants at
the Moderate Downside

Acquisition offer for
Company A

Value
$30,000,000

Probability

Fixed claim (e.g., lender)

$30,000,000

Turnaround (if successful)

$50,000,000

75%

Turnaround (if unsuccessful)

$20,000,000

25%

In this hypothetical, Company A receives an offer to sell its assets
for $30 million-a price that satisfies an outstanding loan (the fixed
claim) but leaves the common with nothing. Company A's alternative
is to attempt a turnaround that involves some risk but is more likely
than not to produce value for the common. All other things being equal,
the fixed claimant will want to accept the offer because it ensures
repayment and the fixed claimant has nothing to gain by the turnaround, but the common holders will want to attempt the turnaround
for at least a chance at obtaining value. If either stakeholder has
assumed a fiduciary obligation to the other, such as by serving on the
corporation's board of directors, courts may scrutinize the fiduciary's
conduct because this incentive structure may compromise the fiduciary's effort to maximize value for the beneficiary. 0
B. Venture Capital as Quasi-Residual Claimants

Sometimes, when the cash flow rights of various stakeholders are
not so distinctly fixed or residual, the incentives are ambiguous.
Employees are fixed claimants with respect to salary but may also be
hypotheticals have expressly analogized to the debtor-creditor context. See
id. at 1886 (noting that the Trados fact pattern "replays the familiar problem
of debt and equity on the downside"); Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at 997
(referring to preferred stock's "debt-like cash flow rights" in the course of
discussing the moderate-downside fact pattern).
50.

The most commonly discussed instance involves a common-controlled board
of an insolvent corporation. In that situation, some courts have suggested
that the board owes a fiduciary duty to the company's creditors and may
labor under a conflict-of-interest to the extent it is beholden to common
holders. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1886-87 (discussing
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commc'n, 324 See Civ. A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)(" Credit Lyonnais") and
subsequent cases reducing the importance of Credit Lyonnais); Baird &
Henderson, supra note 18, at 1324-28 (discussing Credit Lyonnais).
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compensated with stock or stock options." Lenders or vendors may be
fixed claimants with respect to certain payment obligations but may
also be paid with stock rights in order to conserve the corporation's
cash. 2 Stakeholders possessing these hybrid economic rights could be
called "quasi-residual claimants" because they have fixed claims on the
corporation's assets but also share somewhat in the corporation's
residual value.5" Trados grapples with a frequently occurring example
of a quasi-residual claimant-venture capital investors in start-up
companies.
Trados Incorporated (Trados) was once a promising company that
developed and sold popular translation software. 4 The company
attracted roughly $30 million in investment from venture capital funds,
which received preferred stock (Trados preferred) and the right to name
several members of the board of directors in exchange for their investment.55 A mix of company founders, key employees, and strategic
investors owned the bulk of the company's common stock and had the
right to designate the remaining board members.56 This subpart examines the terms of the Trados preferred in detail to illustrate how preferred holders-traditionally categorized as fixed claimants-defy easy
categorization.
1. Fixed Claim: Liquidation Preference

Typical of preferred stock in a variety of contexts, the Trados
preferred had a fixed claim on the corporation's assets in the form of a
51.

See THERESE H. MAYNARD & DANA M. WARREN, BUSINESS PLANNING:
FINANCING THE START-UP BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING

319-22 (2010) (discussing equity compensation practices with respect to
employees and non-employee service providers).
52.

See id. at 319-321.

53.

Sometimes the term quasi-residual claimant is used to describe how the
incentives of fixed claimants change when the corporation is insolvent and
fixed claimants therefore have a residual-like interest in increasing firm
value to ensure repayment. See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 14, at 332-35
(discussing how low asset value and other factors place a fixed claimant in
a position similar to that of a residual claimant). Elsewhere, the term quasiresidual claimant is used to describe a claimant with a mix of cash flow
rights. See, e.g., Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The
Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL J. CORP.
L. 189, 211-14 (2000) (describing how employees become quasi-residual
claimants when salary is supplemented by equity-based compensation such
as stock options). This article uses the term in the latter sense.

54.

In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 21 (Del. Ch. 2013).

55.

Id. at 20, 33.

56.

See Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification at 1-4, In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (2013)
(No. 1512-VCL) (identifying members of the plaintiff class).
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liquidation preference. 7 In the event of a merger or liquidation of the
company, the liquidation preference entitled the preferred holders to
8
certain payments before common stockholders could receive anything.
The preference was equal to the amount originally invested by the funds
plus an additional amount representing an eight percent annual
dividend that accrued but was not actually paid out. 9 The liquidation
preference totaled roughly $60 million by 2005, meaning that preferred61
0
holders would receive all proceeds of any sale" at or below $60 million.
2. Quasi-Residual Claim: Conversion Rights
In addition to a fixed claim on the liquidation preference, holders
of the Trados preferred could also share in the company's successes
through conversion rights. Specifically, the preferred stock was convertible into common shares at the election of the venture capital
investors or if the company demonstrated a high level of success by
completing an initial public offering (IPO).62
Such conversion rights are ubiquitous in venture capital financings. 3 Outside of the venture capital industry, preferred stockholders
often have only debt-like financial rights that entitle preferred holders
to a stated dividend and a liquidation preference with any residual value
inuring to the benefit of the common holders. 4 Because this more
conventional model of preferred stock places a ceiling on the holder's
possible gains, it would be unsuitable to venture capital investing where
most start-ups fail and investors must rely on a few big successes in

57.

See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 51, at 471 ("[P]referred stock is

generally distinguished by having the right to receive dividends or liquidation
distributions before common stock. . . ."); Korsmo, supra note 14, at 117172 (listing a liquidation preference as a core attribute of preferred stock).

58.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 21-24 (describing the terms of the Trados
preferred).

59.

Id.

60.

Theoretically, sale could mean either (1) piecemeal sale of individual
assets or (2) sale of the company as a going concern through a merger or
sale of substantially all assets. Following the facts of Trados, this article
uses the term in the latter sense.

61.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 20 (describing the result of the transaction
for common and preferred shareholders).

62.

See id. at 21-22 (describing the conversion terms of the Trados preferred).

63.

See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanationfor Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 874, 879 (2003).

64.

See Melissa M. McEllin, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to
Preferred Shareholder Rights, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 895, 899-902
(2010) (describing terms of traditional preferred stock).
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order to achieve acceptable rates of return on a portfolio basis.65
Accordingly, venture capital funds almost always receive the right to
convert into common stock, give up their liquidation priority and
dividend rights, and share in value beyond such fixed amounts.66
On an as-converted basis, Trados preferred holders owned about
half of the company's shares. In other words, holders would convert
into common and forfeit their liquidation preference if the company
could sell, or complete an IPO, at a high enough price. For example,
had Trados sold to Microsoft for $500 million net proceeds, the
preferred holders would have converted and been entitled to
approximately $250 million as common holders rather than being
limited to their $60 million liquidation preference.
3. Quasi-Residual Claim: Participation Rights
Finally, some of the Trados preferred had "participation rights" up
to a multiple of the amount invested. Participation rights allow
preferred holders to share in moderate successes by receiving both their
liquidation preference and a portion of any remaining proceeds from a
merger or liquidation that might otherwise go to common shareholders.6" It is customary for participation rights to be limited to a multiple of the amount invested.69 The participation right becomes valuable
when the company is acquired for a price that does not justify
65.

See Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy,
Yesterday's Start-Ups, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195,

232 (2013). As a rule of thumb, the bulk of investment returns to venture
capital funds are believed to come from 20% or fewer of their portfolio
companies. See id. at 230 n.202. Empirical research supports the proposition

that a very small number of successful investments drive returns to venturecapital investors. See id. (reviewing empirical research); John Cochrane, The
Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 3, 30 (2005)

(analyzing venture capital investments and observing, even among
companies that have achieved exit through an acquisition or IPO, a "small
possibility of earning a truly astounding return, combined with the much
larger probability of a more modest return"). There are, however, significant
methodological challenges in empirically assessing the performance of
investments in startups. See id. at 4-6 (describing selection-bias problems
because investment outcomes are primarily observed in connection with
positive exits such as IPOs and acquisitions).

66.

See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 63, and George G. Triantis, Financial
Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305,
317-20 (2001), for a more comprehensive explanation of why convertible
stock is appropriate for venture capital investments.

67.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 34 (showing ownership percentages of various
stockholders).

68.

See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 51, at 499-517 (describing
participation rights).

69.

Id. at 507.
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conversion into common but that does create some value above the
liquidation preference.70 For example, had Trados sold for $120 million
and assuming all Trados preferred had participation rights, the venture
capital funds would have received a total of $90 million ($60 million
liquidation preference plus $30 million representing one-,half of the
remaining proceeds). In fact, the preferred stock was issued in various
series, only some of which had these participation rights. 71
C. The Conceptual Problems Posed by Quasi-Residual Claimants
The Trados litigation arose when the Trados board approved sale
of the company through a merger transaction in which preferred holders
recovered the bulk of their liquidation preference but common holders
received nothing.72 Disgruntled common holders responded with both
an appraisal proceeding alleging that the transaction undervalued their
shares and duty of loyalty claims against board members affiliated with
the venture capital funds.73
At first blush, the disproportionate payouts alone might seem to
warrant exacting fairness scrutiny for the loyalty claims. For example,
under the well-known case Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien,"
Delaware courts apply fairness when a controlling shareholder receives
a benefit "to the exclusion and at the expense of" other shareholders.75
One might think the case applies to Trados because preferred shareholders received merger consideration to the exclusion of common
shareholders. A closer examination of Sinclair,however, suggests otherwise and reveals the novelty of the questions posed by Trados.
Sinclair involved claims by minority shareholders of Sinclair
Venezuelan Oil Company (Subsidiary) against its majority shareholder,

70.

See id.

71.

The participating shares constituted approximately one-third of the

preferred shares. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d. at 21-23 (describing the
terms of the Trados preferred).
72.

Id. at 20.

73.

Id. at 34-35.

74.

280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).

75.

Id. at 720. Though Sinclair involved claims against a controlling
shareholder rather than board members, it is still instructive. Generally,
fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders are more circumscribed than
fiduciary duties of board members. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout,
Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1273

(2008) (explaining that "shareholder fiduciary duties are commonly
understood to exist only for controlling shareholders" and in limited
contexts). Therefore, board action that benefits a director's affiliate to the
exclusion and at the expense of other corporate stakeholders is presumably
as (or more) problematic than similar action by a controlling shareholder.
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Sinclair Oil Corporation (Parent).76 Plaintiffs accused the Parent of selfdealing.77 More specifically, the Parent used its control to orchestrate a
contract between the Subsidiary and another affiliate that required the
latter to buy a specified level of output from the Subsidiary.7" The
Parent then allowed its affiliate to breach the contract by making late
payments and failing to buy the specified amounts.7 9 Because the
contractual breaches resulted in improper benefit to the Parent at the
Subsidiary's expense, the court applied fairness review to the Parent's
actions.8 0
Nothing in Sinclair warrants fairness review based solely on the
receipt of a negotiated liquidation preference by a venture capital
investor. Unlike the contract and subsequent breaches at issue in
Sinclair, the terms of the Trados preferred were apparently negotiated
at arm's length with an independent board.8 ' Courts treat preferred
stock rights as contractual rights, and corporate law sanctions contracts
insiders and a corporation
(and their subsequent performance) between
82
where properly approved at the outset.

76.

Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719.

77.

Id. at 720-21.

78.

Id. at 722-23. In addition to these self-dealing claims, the plaintiffs accused
the Parent of "denial of expansion opportunities" through large (though
statutorily permitted) dividends and channeling new business to other
subsidiaries. Id. at 720-21. The court concluded that those claims should
be evaluated under the deferential business judgment rule. Id. at 722.

79.

Id. at 723.

80.

Id.

81.

There are cases in which venture capital funds obtain board representation
and then use their insider position to extract favorable terms in subsequent
financing rounds. E.g., Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618,
628 (Del. Ch. 2013). But those allegations were not made in Trados.

82.

See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013); DEL. GEN.
CORP. L. § 144 (citing corporate-law statutes that permit self-dealing when
approved by independent directors or shareholders); Bratton & Wachter,
supra note 14, at 1892 ("Value was taken in Trados, but only pursuant to
the ex ante contract."). Even those who view a board's duties to preferred
shareholders narrowly recognize the validity of preferred-stock preferences.
See Strine, supra note 14, at 2027 ("The prevailing theory is simple: preferred
stockholders are preferred to the extent that they secure preferences (i.e.,
additional rights that may have economic value) in their contract."). But see
Orban v. Field, 92 No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 at n.26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997)
(suggesting that in some circumstances a board might have a fiduciary
obligation to engage in efficient breach of a contract with preferred holders).
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Accordingly, the Trados plaintiffs had to make a less straightforward claim. They focused their arguments on the timing of the transaction rather than the division of proceeds.83 They alleged that Trados
was viable as a standalone entity, had been enjoying improving fortunes
by some measures, and could be sold at a better price if given more
time to operate as an independent company. 4
With nothing more, a poorly timed sale sounds like a duty of care
rather than loyalty issue. To imbue the claims with a loyalty element,
the plaintiffs argued that the preferred holders' fixed claim (the
liquidation preference) created the same incentive incompatibility as
the creditor example in Hypothetical A above."6
There is a problem, however, with this story: the venture capital
investors were quasi-residual holders. All of the preferred holders had
conversion rights, which entitled them to share in any large-scale
successes.86 Some of the preferred holders also had participation rights,
which entitled them to share in any proceeds above the liquidation
preference. 7 If there was additional value to be squeezed out of Trados,
why would these investors pull the plug too early?
To illustrate the court's difficult task, it is useful to first recast the
payouts from Hypothetical A in terms of a preferred stock financing.
While this and other hypotheticals in this article are artificial in several
respects, 8 the exercise is nonetheless valuable in illustrating the
additional conceptual challenges posed by quasi-residual claimants:

83.

In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6-*7
(Del. Ch. July 24,

id.

2009).

84.

See

(describing the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claim).

85.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 49 (characterizing preferred stock cash flow
rights as "debt-like").

86.

See supra Part I.B.2 (describing conversion rights).

87.

See supra Part I.B.3 (describing participation rights).

88.

Most fundamentally, courts never have such concrete knowledge of expected
outcomes. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2037 (discussing the difficulty of
assessing competing expert testimony regarding the value of corporate entities
and transactions). In addition, I have, like other commentators, assumed a
risk-neutral investor. E.g., Brian Broughman, The Role of Independent
Directors in Startup Firms, Utah L. Rev. 461, n. 35 (2010). Finally, I have
assumed that any discount rate for the time delay of a turnaround or pivot
in strategy is already reflected in the expected values presented.
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Hypothetical B: VC Preferred and Common at the Moderate
Downside
Acquisition offer for
Company B

Value
$30,000,000

Probability

Liquidation preference
(investment amount +
accrued dividends)

$30,000,000

Turnaround (if successful)

$50,000,000

75%

Turnaround (if unsuccessful)

$20,000,000

25%

If one focuses on the liquidation preference alone, this hypothetical
produces precisely the same incentive incompatibility as Hypothetical
A. The residual holder will want to roll the dice on a turnaround
because there is no upside in accepting the offer. Putting aside
participation rights for the moment, the fixed claimant (in this case, a
preferred shareholder) will want to act conservatively because it has
nothing to gain by taking the risk. If preferred shareholders control the
board, there may be serious question whether we can trust that board
to guard the interests of common holders. 9
Now consider the effect of participation rights on the parties'
incentives. Assume that all of the preferred shares in Hypothetical B
have such rights and the preferred shareholders own half the company
on an as-converted basis. In that event, the turnaround would have an
expected value of $35 million to the preferred shareholders because they
are entitled to both their liquidation preference and a portion of any
additional value (up to a specified cap).9" The question becomes: does
an extra $5 million in average expected value adequately motivate the
preferred holder to attempt the turnaround?
Next, consider how conversion rights affect incentives, even without
participation rights. First, assume a wider range of possible outcomes
than presented in Hypothetical A. In Trados, for example, management
presented the board with a variety of strategies with varying levels of

89.

90.

As discussed further below, the Chancery Court clearly identified the
common holders as the primary beneficiaries of the board's duties, though
commentators have advocated for a different rule. See infra text
accompanying notes 136-38.
The amount is calculated as follows: (.25 * $20,000,000) + (.75 *
($30,000,000 + (($50,000,000 - $30,000,000) / 2)).
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risk and potential reward."1 The highest risk strategy was to significantly revamp the company's business plan-a "pivot" in start-up
company jargon. 2 If successful, this pivot strategy would have opened
up a much larger market for the company and potentially resulted in
considerably more value than immediate sale. To illustrate the potential
effects of such a pivot, consider a new hypothetical with an expanded
range of expected outcomes:
Hypothetical C: Preferred and Common With Potential Pivot9 3

Acquisition offer for
Company C

Expected Value
$30,000,000

Probability

Liquidation preference
(investment amount +
accrued dividends)

$30,000,000

Pivot (if successful)

$300,000,000

20%

Pivot (if no improvement)

$30,000,000

40%

Pivot (if unsuccessful)

$0

40%

Even without participation rights, the pivot has an average
expected value of $42 million to the preferred holders because they have
4
at least some opportunity to convert and participate in a large success.
Does an extra $12 million in expected value adequately motivate the
preferred holders to attempt the pivot?
Under these payout scenarios, the incentives of preferred and
common holders appear to point in at least the same general direction.

91.

See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 29 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(describing three strategies for the company named "Merge-Up," "Harvest,"
and "Merge-Up Adjacent").

92.

For a list of well-known pivots by successful start-ups such as Twitter, Groupon,
Paypal, and Instagram, see Jason Nazar, 14 Famous Business Pivots,
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013 10:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonnazar/
2013/10/08/14-famous-business-pivots/ [http://perma.cc/8AUK-PYE6].

93.

For relevant assumptions, see note 88.

94. The amount is calculated as follows: (.4 * $30,000,000) + (.2 * ($300,000,000
/ 2)). For a discussion of why the acquisition price does not reflect the value
of the pivot, see infra note 110.
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The question, therefore, is not whether common and preferred incentives are compatible. Rather, the question is a more nuanced one: are
the preferred holder's incentives adequate?
To be clear, there are payout scenarios where participation and
conversion rights have limited effects and the incentives of preferred
and common holders clash as in Hypothetical A and the examples
typically used to illustrate the moderate downside. 5 Specifically, when
a turnaround has an expected value that is especially close to the
preferred stock liquidation preference, participation and conversion
rights might fail to capture much value and receipt of the liquidation
preference is clearly preferable for the holder of preferred stock. 6 But
this limited range of clear incentive incompatibility arises in precisely
the situation where common holders have the least to gain by
continuing and suffer the least severe consequences from a sale. As soon
as we introduce some meaningful chance at higher values above the
liquidation preference, participation and conversion rights begin to
align incentives.97
The law has never required perfect incentive alignment. For
example, most corporate directors for U.S. publicly traded companies
are quasi-residual claimants. Annual cash compensation in the form of
director fees constitutes a fixed claim on corporate assets.9" In an
attempt to better align the interests of board members and shareholders, directors also receive equity compensation such as restricted
stock or stock options. 9 While these residual-like claims may bring the
board members into better alignment with common shareholders than
purely fixed compensation, this is a different sort of equity interest than
that of a long-term shareholder. Board members typically receive
95.

See supra note 44 (referring to examples of moderate downside).

96.

For example, if Hypothetical C is altered so that a pivot has an eighty percent
chance of producing $35 million and a twenty percent chance of a total loss,
then the preferred holders might prefer the $30 million sale because
participation rights do not give the preferred sufficient interest in the pivot's

success. But doing so forecloses an opportunity for the common holders to
realize $2 million in value (their share of the average expected value of a pivot).
97.

For instance, if we alter the example in note 96 so there is just a five
percent chance of a $300 million exit, the expected value of the turnaround
to preferred holders exceeds the sale price and the question becomes one
of incentive adequacy rather than incompatibility. Similarly, if one
assumes an eighty percent chance of a $50 million (rather than $35
million) outcome and a twenty percent chance of a total loss, the expected
value of a turnaround to the preferred holders exceeds the sale price and
the question is one of incentive adequacy rather than incompatibility.

98.

See Katherine M. Brown, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102, 1121-22 (discussing annual cash fees to directors).

99.

See id. at 1122-29 (describing equity compensation practices).
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annual or semiannual grants of equity awards, meaning that board
members potentially profit from stock price volatility that fails to produce value for long-term shareholders. °0 If this imperfect alignment of
incentives resulted in close judicial scrutiny, there would be little room
for the business judgment rule.
In fact, even where all shareholders hold the same type of residual
cash flow rights, differing ownership percentages can skew incentives.
Consider a company with an all-common structure and a board
comprised of: a representative of a corporate conglomerate that owns
25 percent of the company's stock, a representative of a private equity
fund that owns 15 percent of the company's stock, an activist hedge
fund that owns 5 percent of the company's stock, and an individual
who is unaffiliated with any of the foregoing and owns 0.01 percent of
the company's stock. Based on differing ownership percentages alone,
a gain or loss by the company has substantially different economic
implications for each shareholder just described. Presumably, the
intensity of each director's incentives vary accordingly.' 1 Yet a showing
of proportional financial benefit (distribution of cash flow in proportion
to common share ownership) has ordinarily been sufficient to defeat
allegations of conflict. 02 If the law required perfect incentive alignment,
proportional financial benefit would not be sufficient.
In short, there was no bright-line rule in Delaware law requiring
fairness review of the Trados board's actions.0 3 Instead, the court was
required to perform a more nuanced and fact-intensive analysis of
incentives.

100. See id. at 1130 (footnotes omitted) ("Critics of using stock options ...
argue that options do not in fact properly align the interests of directors
and shareholders. Unlike holders of 'straight' equity, option holders 'share
in the creation of shareholder value but not in its erosion' because options
asymmetrically reward only stock price appreciation. This asymmetry can

make directors too risk-inclined.").
101. For an example of these incentive effects outside of corporate law, see STEVEN
D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 72 (2005) (finding that real

estate agents receiving percentage commissions sell houses faster and for lower
prices than when they sell their own houses). See also Robert H. Sitkoff, The
Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B. U. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2011)
(using the real-estate commission example to illustrate the intractability of
incentive misalignment between beneficiaries and fiduciaries).
102. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65-66
(Del. 1989); In re Morton's Rest. Grp. Inc. S'holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656,
662 (Del. Ch. 2013); In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022,
1040 (Del. Ch. 2012).
103. But see infra Part IV.A (acknowledging, but disfavoring, an alternative
reading of Trados that hinges fairness review on the imperfect incentive
alignment between common and preferred).
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D. The Trados Solution: Opportunity-Cost Analysis

The trial court directly confronted the analytical challenge of quasiresidual rights by discussing incentives of directors affiliated with funds
possessing participation rights. This analysis marks an important step
forward in analyzing the moderate-downside fact pattern in venture
capital financings. PretrialTrados gave only lip service to the defendants' arguments that their incentives were aligned with common
holders. 1 4 Legal scholarship to date, though deserving credit for many
key insights on which this article builds, 105 has sometimes analyzed the
moderate-downside with stylized fact patterns that assume away
participation or conversion rights.0 6
The trial court grounded its analysis of the defendants' incentives
in a well-chronicled pattern of behavior in venture capital investing.
The court explained:
Venture capitalists will sometimes liquidate an otherwise viable
firm, if its expected returns are not what they (or their investors)
expected, or not worth pursuing further, given limited resources
and the need to manage other portfolio firms. This may seem
irrational, but it makes perfect economic sense when viewed from
the venture capitalist's need to allocate [his] time and resources
among various ventures. Although the individual company may
be economically viable, the return on time and capital to 107
the
individual venture capitalist is less than the opportunity cost.
104. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at

*7 (Del Ch. July 24, 2009) (briefly acknowledging defendants' arguments
that incentives of common and preferred holders were aligned).
105. For example, Bratton and Wachter provide a particularly strong analysis
of the difficulty parties will have contracting around Trados-an insight
that is aligned with this article's ultimate recommendation for a narrow
interpretation of the case. See infra Part IV.C. In addition, a number of
legal scholars have usefully introduced the shut-down dynamic to legal
scholarship. See infra note 107.
106. Principally, Bratton and Wachter demonstrate incentive-incompatibility
through an example similar to Hypothetical B. In that example, they
disregard participation rights, and they choose value ranges for which
conversion rights are not relevant. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at
1886. In contrast, other commentators use examples that implicate
conversion rights (but do not include participation rights). See, e.g., Brian
J.Broughman, supra note 88, at 471-74; Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at
995-97; Sepe, supra note 14, at 351-55.
107. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 51 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting
William A. SahlIman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 507 (1993); Michael A. Utset,
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of
Venture-CapitalFinancedFirms, 2002 WiSC. L. REV. 45, 110, n. 218; Michael
A. Utset, High-Powered (Mis)incentives and Venture Capital Contracts,
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An example helps illustrates the "shut-down" dynamic as depicted
in legal scholarship and invoked by the court. Assume that the preferred
holder in Hypothetical C is a $200 million venture capital fund (Fund
C) that invested $20 million in ten separate start-up companies.
Company C's preferred controlled board must now decide whether to
accept the $30 million offer (equal to the liquidation preference) or
attempt the pivot with an average expected value of $42 million. How
would the fund decide?
One way to answer the question is to focus on the effort the fund
will exert in attempting a pivot. Company C will look to the fund for
assistance with hiring new executives with relevant experience,
performing market research, making budgeting decisions, evaluating
progress by analyzing sales results, considering and negotiating
financing alternatives for new initiatives, and assessing exit strategies
if the initiatives are successful.0 ' The fund managers have only so much
time; continuing with Company C limits the time available for other
portfolio companies." 9 In other words, Company C's pivot has opportunity costs that will likely drive the fund's decision.
7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. Bus. L. J. 45, 56 (2012)). In its discussion of the shutdown dynamic, the court also cited additional sources, such as Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation,54 UCLA L. REv. 37, 56 n.78 (2006); Broughman & Fried, infra
note 153; Fried & Ganor, supra note 44; D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure
of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 356 (2005).
108. Venture capital investors are recognized as particularly active investors,
providing companies with significant managerial assistance. See
MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 51, at 435 ("Venture capital investors
make their knowledge, contacts, and expertise available to their portfolio
companies and consult with and assist management on almost every key
decision the company faces."); Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1169-70
(discussing venture capital investors active role in management of
portfolio companies and their expertise in finance and management); D.
Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contractingin the Information Age, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. 133, 138-40 (1998) (discussing a wide range of
managerial assistance provided by venture capital managers, including
advice related to marketing, strategy, financing, and recruiting).
109.

One might ask why funds do not hire additional personnel to maintain an
active role in all viable companies. In short, hiring and supervising additional
agents is expensive. For example, researchers have considered an analogous
question-the optimal size for a venture capital fund. See generally Douglas
J. Gumming, The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical
Evidence, 79 J. Bus. 1083 (2006) (modeling venture capital portfolio
construction); JOSH LERNER, ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL,
AND THE FINANCING OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE POWER OF ACTIVE

INVESTING 349-71 (2012) (describing the effects of increasing fund sizes);
Diane Mulchaney, et al., "We Have Met the Enemy ... and He Is Us":
Lessons From Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation's Investments in
Venture Capital and the Triumph of Hope Over Reason (2012) (noting
superior performance of smaller funds in the Kauffman Foundation's own
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For example, assume (1) the fund has seen four of its portfolio
companies file for bankruptcy without any return to equity; (2) two of
the remaining portfolio companies have prospects similar to Company
C, and (3) the remaining three portfolio companies have slightly better
prospects such as a thirty percent chance for a $300 million outcome, a
forty percent chance for $30 million outcome, and a thirty percent
chance for a total loss. If the fund only has the time and resources to
continue with three companies, the fund will want to sell Company C
even if attempting the pivot has a higher expected value.1 ' Put another
way, opportunity costs impair the fund's incentives to wring out
additional value available from Company C.
Some of the evidence in Trados fits this account particularly well.
The court summarized one director's testimony as follows:
[Tihe evidence at trial established that Gandhi faced a conflict
and acted consistent with Sequoia's interest in exiting from
Trados and moving on. As Gandhi explained at trial, when
portfolio); Sven Weber & Jason Liou, Dialing Down: Venture Capital
Returns to Smaller Fund Sizes, SILICON VALLEY BANK (May 31, 2010),
https://www.svb.com/Blogs/Aaron Gershenberg/Dialing.Down
Venture
CapitalReturns to Smaller Size Funds/ [http://perma.cc/4833-QQJC]
(discussing the advantages of smaller sized venture capital funds). According
to this literature, adding companies to a portfolio initially has benefits, such
as diversification and complementary investments. See Cumming, supra, at
1087 (modeling fund portfolio construction and explaining why the projected
marginal benefits curve will initially slope upwards). At some point, however,
marginal costs increase due to agency costs associated with any additional
personnel, inattention if additional personnel are not hired, potential conflicts
and competition among portfolio companies, and other factors. See Cumming,
supra,at 1087-90 (discussing increasing marginal costs of expansion); Lerner,
supra, at 360-62 (discussing the costs of expansion, including managing
additional personnel). Consistent with this model, empirical research indicates
that fund performance eventually declines with size. LERNER ET AL., supra,
at 357-370 (observing declining performance at $280 million fund size); Weber
& Liou, supra, at 6-7 (identifying $250 million as an optimal fund size);
Mulchaney et al., supra, at 23-26 (criticizing the performance of funds over
$500 million).
110. In such a circumstance, one might wonder why an entrepreneur cannot
convince a third party of a pivot's value and engineer a more advantageous
sale transaction or other take-out of Fund C. The primary obstacle to such
a transaction is information asymmetry-ntrepreneurs will have a difficult
time convincing third parties of the value of pivot. See Gilson & Schizer,
supra note 63, at 878-79 (discussing problems of information asymmetry in
early stage companies); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use
Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18
J. Corp. Fin. 1104 (2012) (discussing how "informational lock-in" makes it
difficult for startups to obtain financing from sources other than existing
venture-capital investors). In addition, the most likely sources of
financing-other venture capital funds-are likely to be just as lukewarm
as Fund C regarding a moderate success.

66 'ISSUE 1 •2015
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW- VOLUME

Sequoia invests, it hopes for "really fast" growth and "very large
outsized returns." Within six months after the Uniscape merger,111
Gandhi had concluded that Trados would not deliver outsized
returns and that Sequoia's "real opportunity" was only "to
recover a fraction" of its $13 million investment in Uniscape. By
the end of 2002, Gandhi had decided not to put significant time
into Trados beyond Board meetings and only to attend by phone
unless meetings were held locally. From his perspective, this was
simply a matter of prioritizing his time based on how Trados
would perform for Sequoia relative to other opportunities with "a
lot of upside." He later elaborated: "[M]y most, you know, limited
resource is just where I'm putting my time. And it's just better
to work on something brand-new that has a chance .... Is [the
next Sequoia investment] going to be Google?""
As characterized by the court, this testimony is a rather frank
admission that Trados was a low priority for this director and that he
was trying to reallocate his time to more promising companies in his
fund's portfolio.
Extrapolating from the specific facts of the case, the court is
identifying a novel, or rarely discussed, fact pattern of opportunity-cost
conflicts. The concept is separate from the conflicts that may arise
between preferred and common cash-flow rights. One can imagine
opportunity-cost conflicts arising even between common shareholders.
Any active investor may be faced with choices among alternative
investments and may allow such concerns to influence decisions made
as a fiduciary. Possible examples include a shareholder in a close
corporation like that depicted in the introduction to this article, active
hedge fund investors, 1 3 and parent corporations with multiple subsidiaries.' In each case, separate and apart from any conflicts created
by divergent cash flow rights, these active investors may have salient
alternatives (opportunity costs) that improperly influence their abilities
to serve in fiduciary capacities.
While novel, the opportunity-cost conflict fits within existing
conceptions of corporate fiduciary law. Returning to the component
loyalty obligations discussed above, opportunity-cost conflicts most
111. Sequouia invested in Trados indirectly-it initially invested in Uniscape,
which then merged with Trados. See Trados, 73 A. 3d at 23.
112. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 52.

113. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 75, at 1278 (discussing increased activism
by hedge funds).
114. For example, the plaintiffs in Sinclair could have framed their "denial of
expansion opportunities" claims as opportunity-cost conflicts. See supra note
78. Notably, the court was hesitant to evaluate those claims under fairness
review, arguably consistent with recommendations in Part III of this article.
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directly implicate the loyalty obligation of full effort.11 The corporate
director who allows alternative investment possibilities to influence his
or her exercise of board power has arguably not pursued the beneficiary's interests with the level of effort expected of a fiduciary. As with
self-dealing, operating under an opportunity cost conflict (that is,
exercising board power with incentives to redeploy capital and service)
is not itself a breach of fiduciary duty."' In Trados, the court determined that the board in fact acted fairly towards the common shareholders because their prospects of obtaining value for their shares was
negligible." 7 But the court had strong evidence that some directors were
allowing extraneous factors to influence their choices on behalf of the
common holders, and so it was understandable that the court departed
from its typical deference to board judgment and examined the fiduciaries' conduct closely." 8
II.

CONCEPTUAL STRENGTHS

Pretrial Trados received significant attention from legal scholars
not only because it affected an economically important method of
finance, but also because it implicates key conceptual considerations.
The opinion has been a springboard for examining fundamental questions such as who fiduciary duties should protect," 9 the important role
that constituency directors play in today's financing market, 2 ' and the
correct "theory" of preferred stock.'21
The trial court's opinion is an important elaboration of Pretrial
Trados but has received little attention in legal scholarship to date.
This Part therefore considers the conceptual strengths of the court's
new reasoning. These strengths include: providing a theoretically sound
framework for analyzing fiduciary behavior, undermining a prominent
alternative to the court's chosen rule of common maximization, and
providing at least a plausible rationale for common maximization.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41 (discussing full effort as a
loyalty obligation).
116. See supra text accompanying note 43.
117. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 77-78 (determining that the merger was fair
to the common shareholders).

118. To be clear, under Trados a fiduciary is not irrevocably required to
continue pursuing the beneficiary's interests-he or she can resign and
cease to be a fiduciary. What the fiduciary cannot do under Trados is let
extraneous factors like opportunity costs influence exit decisions that are
supposed to be made on the common holders' behalf.
119. See Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1185-89 (discussing Trados).
120. See Sepe, supra note 14, at 345-50 (discussing Trados).
121. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1874-1900 (discussing Trados).
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A. Sound Underpinnings
The Trados court's portrayal of investor behavior-and the
influence of investment alternatives-is well grounded in economic
theory. In other words, consideration of opportunity costs may be
necessary to the extent courts are committed to analyzing incentive
structures of venture capital and other investors.
In economics, it is axiomatic that individuals make decisions on the
basis of opportunity costs.122 Opportunity costs are distinct from the
undesirable consequences of a decision and from the types of expenditures and accruals categorized as costs by accountants.123 Instead, the
opportunity cost of a proposed course of action is the highest value
alternative forsaken. 24 The concept takes on vital importance in
economics because in a world of scarce resources economic actors cannot
pursue every course of action with positive expected value in the sense
of producing desirable outcomes or attributes in excess of undesirable
outcomes or attributes. Instead, economic actors must make decisions
by comparing the value of alternatives.'25 Thus, when one considers
whether to build a swimming pool, the costs that drive the decision are
not cash outlays for concrete or the pain of digging or supervising the
work. Though unpleasant in some sense, these factors are not choice
influencing in the absence of a comparator such as buying a new car,
spending time with family, or saving for retirement. 26
Some observers have nibbled away at the edges of this insight by
questioning how effectively people make such comparisons. 2 7 One

122. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 5-6 (6 th ed. 2011)
(identifying the concept of opportunity costs -"The Cost of Something Is What
You Give up to Get It"-as one of his "10 Principles of Economics"); Karen I.
Vaughn, Does it Matter That Costs Are Subjective?, 46 SOUTHERN ECON. J.
702 (describing opportunity costs as a "benchmark of 'economic thinking").
123. See ARMEN ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 301 (1969)
(contrasting opportunity costs with the "undesirable attributes of some
event"); Vaughn, supra note 122, at 705 (contrasting opportunity costs
with "outlays" or expenditures).
124. See ALCHIAN, supra note 123, at 301 ("In economics, the cost of an event
is the highest-valued opportunity necessarily forsaken.").
125. See id. at 302 (explaining that one "cannot choose all events whose desirable

features more than offset their undesirable ones").
126. Id. at 303-04.
127.

E.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY RATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT

SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 55-74 (2010) (describing experimental research in
which participants' choice of products was irrationally affected by setting
the price of one item at zero).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW - VOLUME 66 - ISSUE 1 • 2015
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law

entertaining survey suggests that even economists struggle with the
concept. 12
But in venture capital and similar contexts, where active investors
must allocate effort among competing projects,'29 it seems likely that
whether a particular course of action is worth it does depend on the
investors' alternatives. The same might not be true of all portfolio
investors-more passive investors may be able to inexpensively add new
securities to a broadly diversified portfolio without foreclosing alternat3
ives. 3 ' But without adding additional personnel, which may be costly,' '
a venture capital fund only has so much human capital to invest. 32
What this means for fiduciary duty analysis is that a court may
have difficulty analyzing incentives without expanding the inquiry
beyond transaction terms and payouts between the parties. The factors
that influence the decision to sell or continue with an investment may
be exogenous to the direct business relationship between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary. In the Trados example, these exogenous factors at
least include the fund's expectations for its other portfolio companies.
But even the portfolio may be too narrow a view. For instance, if Fund
C in the example above has a relatively weak portfolio, then Company

128. See P. J. Ferraro & L. 0. Taylor, Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity
Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performancefrom the Dismal Science,
4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 7 (2005) (describing survey
results in which a majority of economists failed to correctly answer a basic
question regarding opportunity costs); but see Joel Potter & Shane Sanders,
Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A
Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?, 79(2) S. ECON. J. 248, 24856 (2012) (suggesting that Ferraro and Taylor's question was not so basic).
129. See supra note 108 (describing the managerial assistance provided by venture
capital funds to their portfolio). This section focuses on the fund manager's
allocation of time, rather than its allocation of financial capital, because the
latter is not available for re-investment in other startups under the terms of
the fund's agreement with its limited partners. See Kate Litvak, Venture
Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation
Arrangements, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 161, 175 (2009) (explaining that "proceeds
are distributed (usually) promptly after profits are realized"). Thus, the
shutdown dynamic involves a redeployment of time and not financial capital.
130. For example, the capital asset pricing model assumes that investors are
compensated for only systematic risk because they can easily diversify
away company-specific risk by holding a broad market portfolio. See
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE
TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 757-76 (2012).
131.

See supra note 109 (discussing the costs of expanding a fund).

132. At least one financial economist invokes the concept of opportunity costs in
modeling a fund manager's investment decisions. See Cumming, supra note
109, at 5 n.4. ("For example, if there are 5 firms in the original portfolio, the
opportunity cost of adding a 6 th firm are the assistance and resources allocated
to the 6 th firm that would have been allocated to the original 5 firms.").
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C may be among its better performers.133 In that case, it is tempting to
assume Fund C is motivated to shut down its other companies to focus
attention on Company C. But Fund C will want to do so only if
continuing with Company C exceeds the opportunity cost of starting a
new fund (if Fund C's poor performance hasn't foreclosed that possibility), changing careers, or spending time with family or a new hobby.
The reference to nonpecuniary uses of time (spending time with
family or friends) is worth expanding on because it underscores the
limits of opportunity cost analysis. In their purest and most provocative
form, opportunity costs are fundamentally subjective and accordingly
difficult to observe. Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan, who devoted
an entire book to the concept of opportunity costs, concluded "[c]ost
cannot be measured by someone other than the decision-maker because
there is no way that subjective experience can be directly observed."" 4
Like economists, therefore, courts may never have full visibility regarding a fiduciary's incentives and choices. 135 But courts, like economists,
may find suitable enough indicia of opportunity costs and make
defensible enough predictions about an economic actor's choices.136
In short, by invoking the shut-down dynamic the court properly
identified the type of external considerations that induce economic
choice and define a fiduciary's incentives. Precisely how this clever
doctrinal solution should be implemented for future cases is the subject
of Part III below. For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the court
sensibly framed the issue at a conceptual level.
B. Normative Implications of Opportunity-Cost Conflicts
So far, this article has assumed that the Trados court was correct
in selecting a rule of common maximization. In other words, it has
assumed that when an affiliate of a preferred holder serves on a board
133. See text accompanying notes 107-108 (discussing a hypothetical venture
capital fund incentivized to shut down a viable company).

134.

JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC

THEORY 43 (1969).

135. For Buchanan, this subjectivity was deeply unsettling to prevailing
applications

of economic theory. Even market prices for factors of

production do not always capture full opportunity costs except in particular
states of equilibrium that Buchanan found unlikely in practice. See Vaughn,
supra note 122, at 707 (discussing Buchanan's requirements). Hence,
Buchanan warned that efforts by economists to guide policy decisions

through cost-benefit analysis were fraught with methodological failures. For
example, Buchanan noted the difficulty of calibrating punishment to crime
if choice-influencing opportunity costs are not measurable. See BUCHANAN,
supra note 134, at 93-94 (discussing the work of Gary Becker).
136. Cf., William Baumol, Review of Cost and Choice, 8 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1210 (1970) (stating that Buchanan is correct in principle but overstates
the problem because market prices closely approximate subjective costs).
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of directors, his or her primary duty is to protect the common shareholders. In fact, this issue is hotly debated. Commentators disagree on
whether the beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duties should be common
holders, preferred holders, the corporation as an entity, or some
combination of those alternatives.
In particular, an alternative rule of "enterprise maximization" has
'
received significant support in recent scholarship. 37
Under a rule of
enterprise maximization, directors would owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation, as distinct from any particular group or class of investors.1 31 In the Trados fact pattern, a rule of enterprise maximization
would mean the board should be trained on the goal of increaseing
enterprise value, regardless of how that value was to be distributed
among investors, and should sell if the expected value of doing so
exceeded the expected value of remaining a standalone entity.
This Part explores how an opportunity-cost focus implicitly supports the court's rule of common maximization by (1) exposing the rule
of enterprise value as too atomistic and (2) suggesting a plausible
explanation for why a rule of common maximization is necessary to
induce entrepreneurs to enter into venture capital bargains.
1.

Why Stop at the Enterprise?

At first blush, the rule of enterprise maximization is normatively
compelling. Proponents of enterprise maximization envision the rule as
a default that the parties could override by specific contractual arrangement. ' In traditional law-and-economics scholarship, such default corporate law rules are ordinarily conceived as majoritarian or bargain
mimicking rules, meaning they are an attempt to approximate what
most parties want most of the time. 4 ' The value in setting such defaults
137. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1885-86 (discussing enterprise
maximization); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1323-28 (noting
case law discussing the concept of enterprise maximization).
138. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1884-86 (discussing enterprise
maximization).

139. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1895-99; Baird & Henderson,
supra note 18, at 1328-33 (suggesting that venture capitalists should be
able to negotiate their fiduciary duties through contract). Baird and
Henderson are somewhat ambivalent towards enterprise maximization
because they question more broadly whether fiduciary-duty analysis, as
opposed to contract principles, should govern. Id. at 3332-38. This author
shares the view that parties should have ability to contract around Trados's
rule. See infra Part IV.C (discussing some of the difficulties parties will
encounter trying to contract around the case).
140. See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 47, at 92 ("Socially optimal
fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors and managers
would have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their
agreements) at no cost."); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18 at 1327
(describing fiduciary

duties as gap-fillers); Thomas A. Smith,

The
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is to reduce transaction costs of the parties entering into a business
relationship through a corporate vehicle.'
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is important that a
majoritarian default rule in fact approximates what most parties want.
In a hypothetical world, featuring a large array of organizational
choices, the standard might not be so high. A particular package of
default rules would serve a useful purpose as long as some constituency
finds it acceptable. Others could simply pick a different entity.
But in practice, there is a fairly limited range of entities from which
entrepreneurs choose. 42 These entities differ across a wide range of
variables including management rights, mechanics of equity compensation, and tax treatment.'
With a small number of entities varying
across a wide range of attributes, it seems likely that choosing an entity
is largely a matter of tradeoff, and parties are likely to accept a great
many suboptimal features of secondary importance as they emphasize

Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 216-17 (1999) (discussing the
approach of "leading economic analysis of corporate law" and citing Frank
Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and Jonathan Macey).
141.

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 92 ("The fiduciary
principle is an alternative to elaborate promises and extra monitoring.");
Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1315 n.28 ("The principal virtue of
using fiduciary duties is contracting efficiency.").

142.

The primary choices are corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs).
Yoichiru Taku, What type of entity should I form?, STARTUP CO.
LAWYER (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.startupcompanylawyer.com/2009/
[http://perma.cc/N4PG-JEZH]
03/12/what-type-of-entity-should-i-form/
[hereinafter What type of entity.j (discussing the choice between corporations
and LLCs). The vast majority of high-growth start-ups seeking venture capital
financing are structured as corporations. See generally Joseph Bankman, The
Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994)
(considering why entrepreneurs and venture capitalists use C-corporations
despite arguable tax advantages of LLCs); Victor Fleischer, The Rational
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137
(2003) (considering reasons for use of C-corporations); Gilson & Schizer, supra
note 63, at 879 (asserting that tax treatment largely explains use of convertible
preferred stock in venture capital financings); Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of
Entity for a Venture Capital Start-up: The Myth of Incorporation,55 TAX
LAW. 923 (2002) (discussing tax considerations in choice of entity decisions);
Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation
Decision, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319 (2013) (reviewing legal scholarship on choice
of entity for venture-backed start-ups). An LLC is considered more suitable
for a livelihood business that is intended to primarily generate income for those
working in the business. See What type of entity?, supra 142 (using the
example of a consulting firm).

143. See Fleischer, supra note 142, at 173 (discussing the role of management
rights and equity compensation practices in choice of entity).
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a few key features in their decision-making. In many cases, considerations outside of corporate law may drive the decision,'44 and the parties
may have limited appetite to fine-tune a large number of corporate
governance features. The upshot is that an unpopular corporate default
rule can itself become a transaction cost as parties make do with it.
With that background, is it reasonable to assume that, ex ante,
parties to a corporate financing will ordinarily want a rule of enterprise
maximization? To understand the case for the rule, start with the
assumption that, all other things being equal, the parties to a transaction want to maximize the size of their combined welfare so there is
more to divide between them.'45 For the moment, also assume that the
parties' combined welfare is measured by firm or enterprise value.14 6
Common maximization may not achieve the goal, framed in this way.
The following payout scenario, which is similar to Hypothetical B
but with worse prospects for a turnaround, helps illustrate the concept:
Hypothetical D: Value-Destroying Turnaround
Acquisition offer for
Company D

Value
$30,000,000

Probability

Liquidation preference
(investment amount +
accrued dividends)

$30,000,000

Turnaround (if successful)

$50,000,000

25%

Turnaround (if unsuccessful)

$20,000,000

75%

Average expected value of
turnaround

$27,500,000

Looking at these payouts alone, the common holders would hazard
the turnaround because they have nothing to lose by doing so-the
preferred have claims on the entire acquisition price through their
liquidation preference. But the average expected value of an attempted
144. See id. at 155-59, 167-73, 182-83 (discussing the tax preferences and
constraints of venture capital limited partners, tax consequences of equity
compensation practices, and the availability of tax-free mergers at exit).
145. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 550-54 (2003) (providing a gametheoretical explanation of why "sophisticated parties at the negotiation
stage prefer to write contracts that maximize total benefits" rather than
preferring "a larger share of a smaller pie").
146.

See Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1313 ("[E]x ante investors
presumptively are interested in maximizing the value of the firm.").
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turnaround is only $27.5 million for the enterprise as a whole, lower
than the $30 million acquisition price. By requiring the board to risk
the turnaround in the interest of common holders, a rule of common
maximization sacrifices enterprise value.
The opposite problem can arise if the law permits a preferredcontrolled board to act solely in the interests of the preferred holders.
Consider again the payout scenario in Hypothetical B, where a
turnaround has better chances of succeeding but the preferred holders
have no claim on value above the liquidation preference. In that case,
the average expected value of the turnaround is $42.5 million for the
enterprise as a whole, substantially exceeding the $30 million acquisition price. 4 ' Unconstrained by fiduciary duties, a preferred-controlled
board might sacrifice enterprise value by acting too conservatively and
accepting the acquisition offer in the interests of preferred holders.
Proponents of enterprise maximization have a seemingly clever
solution to this apparently value-destroying conflict-they place the
entity (rather than any subset of shareholders) at the center of the
board's duties. So oriented, the board evaluates each decision it makes
by a single yardstick of enterprise value without any regard for the
distribution of that value among investors. 14 Thus, in Hypothetical D
the board would be compelled to approve the sale because the offer
price exceeded the average expected value of the turnaround, and in
Hypothetical B, the board would be compelled to attempt the turnaround because its average expected value exceeded the acquisition
price.14 These decisions maximize combined welfare in the sense of producing the most value from the entity in question.
An opportunity-cost focus, however, complicates this tidy analysis
by expanding our focus beyond the enterprise to opportunity costs that
affect combined welfare more broadly conceived. Consider again Fund
C, which chose to shut down Company C in order to focus on more
promising portfolio companies.' In that hypothetical, the pivot had an
average expected value of $72 million for the enterprise as a whole,
higher than the $30 million acquisition offer. Under a rule of enterprise
maximization, the board would be compelled to attempt the pivot. But
147. Note that the hypothetical, like others in this article, assumes that all
parties are risk-neutral. See supra note 88. But in reality, significant
dispersion of expected returns may in fact affect value for some parties.
In other words, determining enterprise value may be far more complicated
for courts than stylized examples suggest.
148. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1885-86 (discussing enterprise
maximization); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1323-28 (noting case
law discussing the concept of enterprise maximization).
149. But see Strine, supra note 14, at 2037 (espousing the view that it is
impractical for courts to discern enterprise value in this manner).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
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doing so forecloses Fund C from redirecting its efforts to its more
promising portfolio companies. In other words, it has a high opportunity
cost to the fund that may very well outweigh the marginal value to
common of continuing.
The example illustrates that enterprise value is in fact a very
incomplete measure of combined welfare. If we expand our focus just
slightly to include effects on the fund's entire portfolio, rather than
limiting our focus to payouts from Company C, the parties maximize
combined welfare by redeploying effort to more promising portfolio
companies. Put another way, directing the preferred to squeeze more
value from Company C is a misallocation of resources because the fund
has a higher value alternative. If it is true, as proponents of enterprise
maximization argue, 151 that the entrepreneur and venture capital fund
want to maximize combined welfare so there is more to divide between
them, it is unclear why they would adopt such a narrow view of
15 2
combined welfare.
Proponents of enterprise maximization might counter that parties
can always strike a Coasian bargain-the venture capital fund can make
a side payment to the common holders at the time a higher value
alternative emerges for the fund. In fact, there is evidence that this type
of pay-off occurs in the venture capital context.'53 But there are also
good reasons to think such "midstream" bargains are difficult to
strike.15 4 More to the point, if a corporate default rule occasions too
151.

See supra text accompanying notes 145-146 (discussing the rationale for

enterprise maximization).

152. There is another more subtle way in which enterprise maximization may
not serve the interests of either class of shareholders-common or
preferred. In some cases, venture capital investors are motivated to
embrace the same long-shot (and enterprise-value sacrificing) strategies
as underwater common holders in order to satisfy investor expectations.
See Cable, supra note 65, at 230 (discussing a rule of thumb that investors
expect a twenty percent internal rate of return on an investment in a
venture capital fund). If a fund manager has a relatively weak portfolio,
he or she may need to gamble on the best of his or her remaining portfolio
companies even if the expected value of those gambles falls below

immediate acquisition offers. In other words, some venture capital

managers have especially low opportunity costs of continuing with a
portfolio company because they can only invest the limited partners'
money once, and they need several large successes to offset high failure
rates for start-ups. Id. at 230-31. See also Darian M Ibrahim, The New
Exit in Venture Capital, Vand. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (2012) (discussing funds'
incentives to seek large exits).
153. See Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in
the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. EcON. 384, 391 (2010) (observing
instances in which common shareholders receive cash payouts in excess of
contractual cash flow rights).
154. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock
and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 910 (2002) (identifying
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many Coasian bargains, one has to begin questioning whether it really
captures the majoritarian bargain. In theory, any rule (including
common maximization) can be bailed out by Coasian bargains, but a
majoritarian default aspires to be more than an arbitrary starting point.
In the end, enterprise maximization-despite its elegance-loses at
least some of its shine when one takes into account the whole portfolio.
One might wonder whether the majoritarian bargain has a different
logic.
2. The Difference Between VCs and Entrepreneurs
In addition to undermining the case for enterprise maximization, a
focus on investors' alternatives suggests a plausible story for why
common maximization would be the majoritarian bargain. In short, a
credible commitment to capital lock-in may be necessary to induce
high-quality entrepreneurs to enter into venture capital bargains.
In a passage that does not make any explicit normative claim, the
Trados opinion states that equity capital is "permanent capital."' 5 In
support of this descriptive statement, the court cites to law review
literature that provides a normative justification of capital "lock-in"
through the corporate form.'56
In one of the cited articles, Margret Blair argues that capital lockin was in fact the core innovation of the corporate form because it
helped induce the type of asset-specific investment necessary for
increasingly complex production problems faced by businesses in the
nineteenth century.' 57 Blair details how common forms of business
association in the nineteenth century-sole proprietorships, partnerships, and joint stock companies-were inadequate for the scale of industrial organizations emerging at the time. 5 ' The primary shortcoming
of these early entities was the ability of financial or other investors to

frequently cited obstacles to corporate midstream bargains, such as
endowment effects and collective-action problems).
155. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013).
156. See id. at 37 n.4.
157. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved

for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387, 388-95 (2003) (discussing the concept of capital lock-in and its role
in the historical origins of the corporate form).
158. See id. at 404-23 (discussing sole proprietorships, partnerships, and joint

stock companies).
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withdraw unilaterally, thereby destroying value of specialized investments of labor and physical assets.6 9 Blair asserts that increasing availability of the corporate form essentially solved this problem with its
perpetual existence and limited rights of investor withdrawal.16
This historical account may tell us something about the conditions
necessary to induce entrepreneurs into venture capital bargains. Entrepreneurs are asked to dedicate themselves for years on end to a single
enterprise with an unproven idea rather than applying and building
their skills and knowledge towards proven technologies and business
plans. 161 The result may be a tailoring of their most valuable assettheir human capital-in a very firm specific way. 2
Trados reminds us that venture capital funds are different. They
operate on a model of diversification, giving them a ready destination
(and incentive) to redeploy their efforts. Of course, they will also make
some firm-specific investments of time. But fundamentally, their expertise is of a more general nature. Venture capital managers have expertise in "professional management," meaning formal methodologies of
accounting, finance, and management taught in business schools and
intended to be applicable across a range of business settings. 3
159. See id.
160. See id. at 423-37 (discussing the corporate form). For the view that the
corporate form was not necessary for all that Blair ascribes to it, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 523, 531-37 (2006).
161.

See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness,Strategic Behavior & Venture
Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-FinancedFirms, 2002 Wis. L.
REV. 45, 57-58 (discussing non-compete obligations or other contractual
penalties imposed on entrepreneurs for exiting a start-up).

162.

See Strine, supranote 14, at 2037 (noting that entrepreneurs make "companyspecific investments just as real as those made by the preferred"); Manuel A.
Utset, High-Powered (Mis)Incentives and Venture-Capital Contracts, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREP. Bus. L.J. 45, 61-62 (2012) (discussing firm-specific
contributions of human capital by entrepreneurs). Labor economist Edward
Lazear explains how even skills that on their face appear transferable to other
employers may lose their marketability when combined in idiosyncratic ways.
He gives the example of a tax-preparation software company in which
employees acquire an unusual mix of tax accounting knowledge and Java
programming skills that are not easily transferable in combination. Edward
P. Lazear, Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill- Weights Approach 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9679, 2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9679.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZUR9-FEE9].

163. See Utset, supra note 161, at 97-99 (discussing the role of venture capital
managers in "professionalizing" start-ups); Korsmo, supra note 14, at n.31
("[Venture capital] investors are usually experienced professionals with formal
academic training in business and finance and on-the-job training as apprentices
at a venture fund or financial institution.") (quoting 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT,
EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS AND
REORGANIZATIONS § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1995)); supra note 108 (discussing the
managerial contributions of venture capital managers).
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A plausible way of understanding common maximization is as a
bargain that is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to make firm specific
investments in start-ups in a context where venture capital investors,
if unconstrained by fiduciary duties, would operate under pervasive
opportunity-cost conflicts. A rule of common maximization protects
entrepreneurs by placing exit decisions under the control of a board
charged with acting like fully committed entrepreneur.
Admittedly, it cuts against grain of current commentary to focus
on what is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to enter into venture
capital contracts. In policy discussions, we tend to focus on what is
necessary to induce financial investment in high-risk entrepreneurship.
Policy makers refer to a "funding gap," implying a large stable of
investment ready start-ups without adequate capital.' Blogs targeted
at entrepreneurs recount the flood of funding proposals received by each
venture capital fund annually and the long-shot odds faced by each
entrepreneur. 6 ' Similarly, proponents of enterprise maximization are
careful to deem the rule a default so that venture capitalists can
negotiate for additional protections to induce investment.'66
But there is a counter-narrative. Some within the venture capital
industry believe that the asset class has grown too large and too many
venture capital funds chase too few good opportunities.6 7 While this
circumstance can be viewed as only a temporary disequilibrium, returns
in the venture capital industry have always been driven by a small
number of very large successes.16 Entrepreneurs may be easy to come
by, but one would expect competition among venture capital firms for
164. See Cable, supra note 65, at 207-08 (describing the funding gap that
entrepreneurs face between the amount they can raise from personal
resources (typically less than $500,000) and the minimum amounts
venture capital funds are willing to invest (typically $5 million)).
165. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.95% Of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting
Time Seeking Venture Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-ofentrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/
[http://perma.cc/R7GA-WVvH8] (stating that venture capital funds reject 9899% of business plans they receive).
166. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1895-99; Baird & Henderson, supra
note 18, at 1328-33.
167. E.g., Paul Kedrosky, Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture Capital Industry
(2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1456431
[http://perma.cc/4N34-AUXH] (arguing that there are too many venture
capital funds relative to investment-ready start-ups); Mulchaney, et. al.,
supra note 109, at 3 ("Speculation among industry insiders is that the VC
model is broken, despite occasional high-profile successes like Groupon,
Zynga, LinkedIn, and Facebook in recent years.").
168. See supra note 65 (discussing the percentage of portfolio companies that
accounts for the bulk of returns on venture capital investments).
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the most talented entrepreneurs with the biggest ideas. Therefore, it
seems at least plausible that lock-in is the majoritarian bargain.169
To be clear, I am not necessarily arguing that this account of
common maximization is more compelling than the case for enterprise
maximization. Commentators identify costs of capital lock-in that may
outweigh its benefits in particular contexts and market conditions. 17 °
The majoritarian bargain is hard to discern in this case.
Still, there is value in simply providing some coherent story for
common maximization. If nothing else, knowing the reason for common
maximization might tell us something about the rule's parameters.
For example, one could read Pretrial Trados, with its compact
reasoning, as requiring a preferred-controlled board to pursue extreme
long-shot opportunities on behalf of the common. In other words, it is
hard to see how a board could ever sell a company below liquidation
value if the rule is as simple as act in the best interest of the common

shareholders.The common will always prefer that the company live to
see another day even if continuing is almost certain to destroy value
that would go to the preferred holders.
But a more palatable rule emerges if we recognize that common
maximization rests on comparative opportunity costs and charges the
board with making decisions like a fully committed entrepreneur in
control of the company. Because even if venture capital funds tend to
have higher opportunity costs because of their more generalizable skills
and ready portfolio of alternatives, entrepreneurs have some opportunity costs of continuing to pour their efforts into a start-up with
questionable prospects. Starting salaries for software engineers are
rumored to exceed $165,000 in Silicon Valley.17 While an entrepreneur's
opportunity cost is difficult to measure precisely, courts should have in
mind that they exist. If continuing with a company has an average
169. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2037-39 (questioning why a rule that is
favorable to preferred shareholders is more conducive to innovation than
common maximization).
170. Ibrahim, supra note 152 (arguing that "investor lock-in" was particularly
problematic when the IPO market froze following the financial crisis); Ribstein,
supra note 160 ("[C]apital lock-in may have significant costs in some contexts
that must be balanced against any economic benefits. The cost-benefit tradeoff
depends on the circumstances of particular firms and may vary over time.").
171. Julie Bort, In Silicon Valley, Salaries For Engineers Are Starting at
$165,000, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:41 PM) http://www.business
insider.com/record-salaries-for-valley-progranmners-2013-10 [http://perma.cc/
YJB9-A6T2]. An entrepreneur will often collect a salary from a startup, but
at a reduced rate. See Allison Shontell, Most Startup Founders Pay
Themselves This Totally Reasonable Salary, Business Insider (May 28, 2014,
10:37 A.M.) http://www.businessinsider.com/startup-founder-salaries-ycombinator-2014-5 [http://perma.cc/CJ67-945P) (reporting that company
founders participating in a prominent incubator typically received salaries
well below $100,000).
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expected value below or only slightly above the liquidation preference,
it is hard to see why a preferred-controlled board should be forced to
continue when the founders themselves likely would not if they were in
control.172

III. OPERATIONALIZING OPPORTUNITY-COST CONFLICTS
For all of the questions Trados answers, a key question remains
open: how aggressively will Delaware courts police opportunity-cost
conflicts? Specifically, Trados is ambiguous regarding what facts
presumptively trigger rigorous fairness review. This Part begins by explaining the important role that standard of review (the choice between
fairness review and the business judgment rule) plays in Delaware
fiduciary law. It concludes by endorsing a doctrine of opportunity-cost
conflicts that would reserve fairness review for exceptional cases.
A. Corporate Law's Distinctive Balance

More so than in other legal fields,173 corporate law articulates
relatively demanding standards of conduct for fiduciaries (conduct
standards) but then declines a role in enforcing those expectations due
to deferential standards of review applied by courts (review standards).' 74 Most prominently, the business judgment rule prevents litigants from challenging most actions by corporate fiduciaries. Even
disastrous decision-making by a board member is ordinarily beyond

172. In a crude sense, the entrepreneur's opportunity cost is the expected
financial payout (e.g., salary) of alternative employment or entrepreneurial
ventures. But, admittedly, comparison of financial payouts is an incomplete
model of the entrepreneur's decision. For example, he or she may
irrationally overvalue the startup's prospects or derive subjective psychic
benefits from its existence. See Utset, supra note 107 (discussing empirical
studies suggesting that entrepreneurs are overly optimistic about their
ventures).
173. See Allen, supra note 41, at 1296 ("In most areas of law, standards of
conduct and standards of review tend to conflate and become one and the
same, but in corporate law the two standards often diverge."); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437 (1993) (citing

negligence in the context of personal injury law as an example of conflated
standards of review and conduct).
174. See Allen, supra note 41, at 1295 (comparing standards of conduct and
standards of review); Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 437 ("A standard of
conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a
given role. A standard of review states the test a court should apply when
it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or
grant injunctive relief."); Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 521 (2012)
(distinguishing standards of conduct and standards of review).
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judicial scrutiny unless there are clear indicia of betrayal or impaired
incentives on the part of the fiduciary.17
Importantly, the business judgment rule does more than give
defendants the benefit of the doubt at trial. Claims that are subject to
the business judgment rule are ordinarily denied judicial process altogether. Typically, a Delaware court will stay discovery pending the
outcome of a motion to dismiss.1 76 A court will grant a motion to dismiss
if it determines "'with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts
that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the plaintiff would
not be entitled to relief.' 1 7 7 Where courts apply the business judgment
175. See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 443 ("[A] director or officer will not be liable
for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation, even if the decision is
unreasonable, as long as the conditions of the business judgment rule have
been met and the decision is rational."); Velasco, supra note 174, at 547
(stating that under the business judgment rule "evidence of a very bad
decision is insufficient" and "plaintiffs must establish that the decision was
utterly irrational and amounted to waste"). For the most part, the exceptions
to this deferential approach are variations on the single theme of self-dealing,
where courts apply more rigorous fairness review. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (scrutinizing a management
buyout); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del 1983) (scrutinizing a
cash-out merger of minority shareholders); Carsanero v. Bloodhound Tech.,
Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013) (scrutinizing financing transactions between
a director and the corporation); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1944) (scrutinizing business dealings between a corporation and its CEO's
wife). See generally Allen, supra note 41, at 1290 (stating that the duty of
loyalty "addresses primarily (but not exclusively) situations involving selfdealing"). A few other specialized situations that receive "intermediate
scrutiny" round out the bulk of viable claims against fiduciaries in corporate
law. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(regarding takeover defenses); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (regarding certain sales of control).
176. See Orloff v. Shulman, No. Civ.A. 852-N, 2005 WL 333240, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Feb.2, 2005) (granting stay of discovery); In re McCrory Parent Corp., Civ. a.
No. 12006, 1991 WL 137145, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 3, 1991) (denying stay of
discovery and discussing circumstances under which Delaware courts grant such
motions); DEL. TRIAL HANDBOOK 2:4 ("It is recognized that efficiency is
promoted by a rule that, absent special circumstances, discovery should be
stayed pending determination of a motion to dismiss where the grounds for the
motion offer a reasonable expectation that if the motion is granted, litigation
will be ended."),
http://www.delawgroup.com/delaware-trial-handbook%C2%A7-24-motion-to-stay-discovery/ [http://perma.cc/4MSF-NXDQ]. The
circumstances in which Delaware courts typically deny a motion to stay
discovery are: "(1) where the motion does not offer a 'reasonable expectation'
of avoiding further litigation, (2) where the plaintiff has requested interim
relief, and (3) where the plaintiff will be prejudiced because 'information may
be unavailable later."' Orloff, 2005 WL 333240, at *1 (citing In re McCrory,
1991 WL 137145, at *1).
177.

Cantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 703 (Del. 2009) (quoting VLIW Tech.,
LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 610-11 (Del. 2003)).
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rule, motions to dismiss are ordinarily granted and the proceeding ends
before discovery; where courts apply entire fairness, motions to dismiss
are ordinarily denied and discovery proceeds. 7 '
What accounts for this stark divergence of review and conduct
standards in corporate law? One possible answer is that corporate
litigation occurs in a distinctive context where the costs of allowing
meritless litigation to proceed (false positives) exceed the costs of
dismissing some claims that actually involve fiduciary misconduct (false
negatives).179 In other words, fiduciary law may reflect a considered
balance between policing managerial misconduct and preventing
litigation abuse, and that balance may take into account the specific
context in which shareholder litigation takes place.
1. The Substantial Cost of Hearing Meritless Litigation
For over seven decades, commentators have expressed concern that
shareholderlitigation is especially susceptible to strike suits-meritless
claims brought for settlement value (and attorneys' fees)."' Shareholder
litigation exhibits a number of features that commentators associate
with litigation waste. Corporate litigation often concerns high-stakes
and time-sensitive matters, such as corporate acquisitions, giving a
shareholder suit substantial hold-up value even if it lacks merit in the
long run. The costs of litigation, including discovery burdens, often fall
disproportionately on corporate defendants, giving suits nuisance value

178. Lewis H. Lazarus, Standard of Review in Conflict Transactions, 26
J. CORP. L. 911, 913-14 (2001).

DEL.

179. Another explanation is that courts are not well equipped to second-guess
business decisions of fiduciaries, and mistaken determinations of liability
would chill beneficial directorial and corporate activity. E.g., Allen, supra
note 41, at 1296; Velasco, supra note 174, at n.153 (collecting cases). This
view is contestable. First, a specialized business court like the Chancery
Court may be relatively well equipped to scrutinize at least some types of
business decisions. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149
U. PENN. L. REV. 1619, 1696 (2001) (stating that Delaware judges may
have expertise and credibility within certain realms of corporate practice).
Also, one might question the importance of judicial competency because
cases almost always settle and courts rarely adjudicate at trial. See infra
note 196. It is even unclear how much the precedent established in
adjudicated cases influences settlement. Cf. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith,
How the Merits Matter, Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 755, 787-91 (2009) (discussing
empirical research revealing a complicated relationship among technical
legal merits, "sex appeal" of a claim, and settlement amounts).
180. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 133, 135-38 (2004) (discussing historical reform efforts).
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at relatively low cost to plaintiffs.'' Dispersed shareholders may be ineffective monitors of their attorneys, resulting in litigation that serves
the interests of plaintiffs' firms more than shareholders."8 ' The law is
conducive to "cosmetic settlements"-such as agreements for nominal
disclosure supplements or governance concessions-that provide a basis
for recovery of attorneys' fees without substantial benefit to shareholders. l 3 The insurance companies that ultimately bear the cost of
litigation may be ineffective monitors of litigation costs or settlement
amounts.8 4
Though it is tempting to give each plaintiff its day in court, these
long-standing concerns about litigation abuse might help explain why
corporate law not only views most potential fiduciary claims with
suspicion but also denies those claims legal process altogether through
pretrial motion practice. After all, strike suits are by definition frivolous
and gain their leverage simply by threatening untimely or expensive
litigation. A doctrine that only affected how courts view cases at trial
might do little to curb meritless claims.8 5 Accordingly, courts develop
proxies for merit-ascertainable fact patterns that are likely to signal
managerial abuse-and apply them early in the litigation process so
that only claims with a high probability of success survive.
2. The Muted Effects of Dismissing Valid Claims
While fear of litigation abuse might explain sparing use of judicial
review, any proxy for merit will be imperfect. Is curbing litigation abuse
181. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 637 (1987) (citing securities class actions as an
example of likely cost differentials between plaintiffs and defendants).
182. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 180, at 148 ("While in theory clients
can and should control all litigation decisions, closely monitoring the
actions of their attorneys, the reality in representative litigation is that
no individual shareholder has a sufficiently large stake in the outcome of

the case to spend much time monitoring the attorneys.").
183. See Coffee, supra note 181, at 634 (asserting that "cosmetic settlements

tend to be a more pervasive problem in derivative actions and securities
class actions than in product liability or mass tort actions"); Jill E. Fisch
et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An

Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557

(2014) (finding that disclosures compelled by settlement do not affect
voting results and therefore provide questionable benefit to shareholders).
184. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors' &1Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 CEO L.J.
1795, 1814-17 (2007) (explaining that D&O insurers do not select defense

counsel under customary policy terms and, therefore, monitor costs and
settlements less intensely than in other insurance contexts).
185. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2035-36 (criticizing standards of review
proposed by Bratton and Wachter because they would preclude motions

to dismiss, allow discovery, and thereby give claims holdup value).
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worth letting some incidents of managerial abuse fall through the
cracks? In other words, shouldn't we be equally concerned about the
costs of false-negatives (i.e., cases that will be dismissed under deferential review standards even when the defendants in fact violated standards of conduct)?
First, litigation operates in combination with a number of other
mechanisms for policing managerial misconduct. Examples include the
market for corporate control, disclosure-based regulation through
federal securities laws, mandated governance features through federal
securities laws and exchange requirements, private contracting, and
reputational constraints."l 6
In fact, according to an influential analysis by Edward Rock and
Michael Wachter, the primary purpose of the corporate form is to
incubate non-legal mechanisms for managing relationships among
stakeholders." 7 Examples include boardroom practices, corporate
governance norms, compensation practices, and other elements of corporate culture.' 9 These nonlegally enforceable rules and standards
(NLERS) are most effectively disseminated and enforced through
market dynamics and reputational constraints rather than judicial
decisions.189 NLERS may be particularly strong in the corporate context
because of the sustained interactions of corporate stakeholders, as
opposed to one-off commercial transactions.19
Second, even where judicial involvement can play a useful rule, it
may not be necessary to provide legal remedies in every instance.
Corporate fiduciaries may follow judicial guidance even without judicial
enforcement. For example, social scientists have studied individuals'
motivations for legal compliance and concluded that fear of punishment
is only one factor. 9' Other motivations include perceptions of legitimacy, personal morality, social consequences, psychological inclination
toward obedience and conformity, and altruistic impulses.' 92 Corporate-

186. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 180, at 142-43 (describing a wide
range of mechanisms for checking managerial abuse).
187. Rock & Wachter, supra note 179, at 1621-22.
188. Id. at 1642-43.
189. See id. at 1645, 1649 (discussing how "competitive forces" and reputational
concerns contribute to NLERS).
190. See id. at 1669 (comparing corporate law to other professional malpractice
settings).
191. See Velasco, supra note 174, at 571-80 (noting that "'normative perspectives'
of personal morality and legitimacy" and "social consequences" are also
strong motivators).
192. Id.
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law scholar Julian Valesco relies on this literature in concluding that
"the unenforced duty is a meaningful concept" in fiduciary law.'93
In sum, there are reasons to be sparing with judicial process in
corporate law. In the corporate context, litigation is particularly susceptible to abuse and alternative mechanisms for influencing corporate
conduct are particularly strong.
3. Some Evidence of an Effective System

It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion regarding whether
corporate fiduciary law currently strikes an optimal balance between
policing managerial and litigation abuse. Though there is substantial
empirical literature considering the question, this research, by its own
admission, faces very difficult methodological challenges such as how
1 94
researchers can define and measure a claim's "merit.'
There is, however, some indication that the system works well
relative to other forms of shareholder litigation. Specifically, evidence
suggests that Delaware class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty
(fiduciary class actions) occasion less litigation waste than class actions
brought in federal court under federal securities law (securities class
actions).195 Traditionally, many empirical studies of shareholder litigation conflate different types of proceedings and find signs of litigation

193. Id. at 580.
194. E.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 179, at 780-83 (discussing methodological
challenges).
195. The primary forms of shareholder litigation are securities class actions,
derivative suits, and fiduciary class actions. See Thompson & Thomas, supra
note 180, at 135-38 (noting an increase in "class action lawsuits filed under
state law challenging director conduct" compared to derivative and securities
fraud claims). Securities class actions are brought under federal securities law
in federal court and typically allege inadequate disclosure by the corporation.
Id. at 144. The other two forms of shareholder litigation typically allege breach
of fiduciary duty by corporate managers and must be brought in state court.
When the alleged misconduct harms the corporation as a whole, such as
embezzlement by a corporate manager, claims are characterized as derivative
and can be pursued by shareholders only if the board is unable (typically due
to a conflict of interest) to itself pursue the matter. See Robert B. Thompson
& Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1758 (2004). Most other fiduciary-duty actionsincluding those that allege harm to a particular group of shareholders or that
challenge the price paid to shareholders in a merger transaction-are not
subject to derivative procedures and are brought "directly" as fiduciary class
actions. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jeurette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del.
2004); EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW at § 327.2 (discussing whether certain merger-related
claims are treated as direct or derivative). Trados is an example of a fiduciary
class action. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 34 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(describing the background of the litigation).
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waste in the aggregate.196 In contrast, Robert Thompson and Randall
Thomas studied a data set consisting of only fiduciary class actions,
and they paint a rosier picture of such litigation. 97 They found some
evidence of litigation agency costs in the form of cookie-cutter
complaints filed quickly and repeat plaintiffs. 98 But they also found
evidence of a better functioning litigation system such as (1) more
significant monetary relief to shareholders199 and (2) settlement amounts correlated with indicators of managerial abuse, suggesting the
"merits matter" in this context.9 0
Arguably, this evidence suggests that the structure of fiduciary
law-sparing use of fairness review and a robust business judgment
rule-is doing some helpful work in balancing efforts to police managerial misconduct and litigation abuse. If nothing else, one might simply
conclude that Delaware fiduciary duty law is likely to influence the
balance between policing managerial misconduct and mitigating litigation abuse. And in the absence of convincing evidence that the law
currently leans too far in favor of one or the other, courts should try to
implement Trados's novel theory in a manner that maintains the
current balance. 291

B. Lessons from Entrenchment: The Other-FactsStandard
In considering how to implement opportunity-cost conflicts consisent with the guidance above, it is useful to review how courts treat a
close cousin: entrenchment claims. An entrenchment claim alleges that

196. Thompson and Thomas review empirical research that combines securities
class actions, derivative suits, and fiduciary class actions. The studies indicate
that a majority of these shareholder suits settle. See Thompson & Thomas,
supra note 180, at 158-59 (reviewing empirical research of shareholder
litigation by Roberta Romano and others). Most of the rest are dismissed or
voluntarily withdrawn. Id. at 158. Among the very small number of cases
that go to trial, almost none result in judgments for plaintiffs. Id. at 159.
Settlement payouts to shareholders tend to be small as a percentage of share
price, with a large amount going towards attorneys' fees. Id. at 159-61.
197. Id. at 138.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 139.
201. Based on recent evidence, there is little to suggest litigation abuse is fading
from concern. A recent study of large mergers produced striking statistics. Over
97% of such transactions in 2013 were challenged by shareholder litigation.
The study reported that nearly 85% of settlements provided for disclosure
concessions (and attorneys fees) of questionable value and no monetary payout
to shareholders. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover
Litigation in 2013 (Ohio State Univ., Working Paper No. 236, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 [http://perma.cc/2PTW-8RUH].
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board members scuttled a sale in order to keep their jobs." 2 It is
basically the flip-side of the opportunity-cost conflict at issue in Trados,
where directors were criticized for selling the company in order to focus
on other opportunities.
Entrenchment and opportunity-cost claims share common characteristics. They are, in a sense, ubiquitous in corporate acquisitions. Every
fiduciary either lacks higher value alternatives and, there-fore, operates
under an entrenchment conflict, or has higher value alternatives and,
therefore, operates under an opportunity-cost conflict. If courts liberally
inferred such conflicts at the motion-to-dismiss stage, fairness review
would be common and the business judgment rule would have little role
in corporate acquisitions. Therefore, it is useful to con-sider how
Delaware courts view entrenchment claims at the motion-to dismiss
stage." 3
Gantler v. Stephens"4 is an instructive case. In Gantler, the plaintiff
claimed that board members pursued a corporate restructuring instead
of a merger because only the former would permit them to keep their
jobs. 2 5 The Delaware Supreme Court overturned the lower court's
dismissal of the claims but did so in a way that still acknowledged the
need for meaningful scrutiny at early stages of the proceeding. 216 The
court began by noting that even the traditionally deferential standard
for a motion to dismiss has its limits:
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss, we view
the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
accepting as true its well-pled allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences that logically flow from those allegations. We do
not, however, blindly accept conclusory allegations unsupported

202.

See infra text accompanying

notes 204-208

(describing an example

entrenchment case).
203. By use of the term "entrenchment," I do not mean to invoke cases
employing the court's intermediate level of scrutiny, though those cases
are sometimes associated with the concept of entrenchment. The courts'
approach to those intermediate-scrutiny cases is, however, similar in effect
to the other-facts standard described in this subpart, at least when the
corporation's charter includes a customary exculpatory clause that
extinguishes duty of care claims. E.g., In re Morton's Rest. Grp., Inc., 74
A.3d 656, 672-76 (Del. Ch. 2013) (dismissing complaint). See also Lewis
Lazarus, Chancery Court Dismisses Revlon and Quasi-Appraisal Claim,
DEL. Bus. LIT. REPORT (July 24, 2014), http://www.delawarebusiness
litigation.com/2014/07/articles/articles/chancery-court-dismisses-revlonand-quasi-appraisal-claim/ [http://perma.cc/A9NL-U2ZH].

204. 965 A.2d 695 (2009).
205. Id. at 699-703.
206. Id. at 703-07.
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by specific facts,20 7nor do we draw unreasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs' favor.
The court then noted the special problems associated
ubiquitous types of conflicts such as entrenchment:

with

Here, the plaintiffs allege that the Director Defendants had a
disqualifying self-interest because they were financially motivated
to maintain the status quo. A claim of this kind must be viewed
with caution, because to argue that directors have an entrenchment motive solely because they could lose their positions following an acquisition is, to an extent, tautological. By its very nature,
a board decision to reject a merger proposal could always enable
a plaintiff to assert that a majority of the directors had an
entrenchment motive. For that reason, the plaintiffs must plead,
in addition to a motive to retain corporate control, other facts
sufficient to state a cognizable claim that the Director Defendants
acted disloyally."'
The court then applied this standard of "other facts" to the case at
hand.20" The court determined that the plaintiff met the standard by
pointing to specific business relationships that were at risk if the
company was sold, such as one director's ownership of a heating and
210
air conditioning company that counted the bank as a major customer.
Gantler offers two lessons for future judicial analysis of opportunity-cost conflicts. First, only facts that strongly indicate impaired
incentives should trigger fairness review. Second, those facts must be
ascertained early in the litigation process in order to warrant discovery.
To preserve corporate law's current balance, courts should evaluate
claims of opportunity-cost conflict consistently with these principles.
As described further below, that means requiring plaintiffs to plead
something more than a disappointing result for plaintiff shareholders.
C. What Qualifies as Other Facts?
What should qualify as "other facts" sufficient to sustain an opportunity-cost claim? To an extent, the answer will depend on context. As
described above, an opportunity-cost conflict could arise in connection
with any active investor.2"1'
Nonetheless, we can start bracketing the possibilities by considering
categories of evidence presented in Trados. In that case, the court considered three types of evidence: testimony revealing improper intent,
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 703-04 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 707-08.

211. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
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industry-wide generalizations regarding behavior of venture capital
investors, and indirect or circumstantial evidence of improper intent.
This subpart concludes that direct evidence of intent will be the
most compelling other facts, and industry-wide generalizations are
unlikely to qualify as other facts. Between those two extremes lie
indirect and circumstantial indications of conflict, which are unlikely to
qualify as other facts ordinarily but also difficult to rule out altogether.
1. Direct Evidence of Intent Qualifies
The most clearly qualifying facts would be statements of intent
consistent with the shut-down dynamic. As described above, at least
one Trados director essentially admitted that he allowed his timeallocation preferences (his desire to spend time on other portfolio
companies) to affect exit decisions that were supposed to be made on
behalf of the common holders. 12 This may be a perfectly understandable
impulse for an active portfolio investor. But under the reasoning of
Trados, it is an impulse that a fiduciary is expected to suppress when
making a decision in a fiduciary capacity."
If a future court had similar evidence before it when considering a
motion to dismiss,214 that would be a compelling basis for letting the
litigation move forward under the other-facts standard.
Of course, this raises the question of how plaintiffs will uncover
such evidence at the outset of a proceeding and prior to discovery. In
many cases, an entrepreneur will have board representation and be
privy to discussions and correspondence regarding exit decisions.
Shareholders also have shareholder inspection rights that permit them
access to documents concerning board decisions. 16 Plaintiffs in securities class actions have used a variety of investigative techniques to
uncover facts without the use of discovery. 216 Some plaintiffs alleging
opportunity-cost conflicts may even have the benefit of some discovery
prior to a motion-to-dismiss. For example, the plaintiffs in Trados con21 7
ducted significant discovery in connection with their appraisal claim.

212. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82 (summarizing testimony at trial).
213. As stated above, this does not mean the fiduciary is forced to allocate time to
the subject company-he or she could resign as a fiduciary. See supra note 118.
214. It does not appear that Ghandi's incriminating statements were available to
the court in hearing the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court might have
dismissed the claim under the recommendations of this article. See infra Part
1V.B.
215.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220

216. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 179, at 769-71 (discussing investigative
techniques of plaintiffs' lawyers, such as former-employee interviews).
217. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 34.
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In other cases, plaintiffs obtain some abbreviated discovery in
connection with requests for injunctive relief.218
In short, plaintiffs are not wholly without means to uncover a
smoking gun.
2. Industry-Wide Generalizations Do Not
Industry-wide generalizations are another candidate for other facts.
For example, perhaps future courts can presume that every director
affiliated with a venture capital fund labors under a significant
opportunity-cost conflict because the shut-down dynamic is an observed
pattern of behavior in the venture capital industry. 19
At first blush, this approach has some appeal as a potentially
effective compromise between policing managerial misconduct and
limiting strike suits. If opportunity-cost conflicts are especially
prevalent in certain realms of economic activity, perhaps courts should
take a harder look at cases arising in those contexts. Both precedent
and policy, however, work against this approach.
First, Trados itself cautions against industry-wide generalizations
in a portion of the opinion unrelated to any of the analysis in this
article. The court found that a supposedly independent director (one
not employed by any venture capital fund) was in the pocket of the
preferred holders because he valued having a business relationship with
prominent venture capital funds.22 ° In so holding, the court referenced
"the web of interrelationships that characterizes the Silicon Valley
start-up community" and cited legal scholarship to that effect.221 The
court, however, clarified that "[a]t trial, the plaintiff could not rely on
'
Instead, the court
general characterizations of the VC ecosystem."222
in
question "was not
the
director
that
prove
to
plaintiff
required the
22
case."
in
this
independent
or
disinterested
In a subsequent case involving sale of a start-up company, the Delaware Chancery Court reiterated that general characterizations are in224
sufficient to increase judicial scrutiny. In Chen v. Howard-Anderson,
the plaintiff claimed that board members were conflicted due to their
218. E.g., In re Morton's Restaurant Group, 74 A.3d 656, 662 (Del. Ch. 2013);
see also Del. Ch., Court of Chancery Guidelines for Expedited Discovery in
Advance of a Preliminary Injunction Hearing, http://courts.delaware.gov/
[http://perma.cc/4L8F-S657]
chancery/docs/PlDiscoveryGuidelines.pdf
(last visited Oct. 08, 2015).
219. See supra note 107 (listing legal scholarship discussing the shut-down dynamic).
220. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 54-55.
221. Id. at 54.
222. Id.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. 87 A.3d 648 (Del. 2014).
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affiliation with venture capital funds that were near the end of their
ten-year term. 25 The plaintiff argued that the looming termination date
skewed the funds' incentives by necessitating liquidation of the funds'
holdings.2 26 Citing Trados, the court rejected that argument and stated:
It is not enough . .. for a plaintiff simply to argue in the abstract
that a particular director has a conflict of interest because she is
affiliated with a particular type of institution. There must be
evidence sufficient to permit a finding that the director in fact
faced a conflict in the specific case.227
Based on this article's reasoning, there are good reasons why courts
have been skeptical of hinging judicial scrutiny on industry-wide
generalizations. To understand a fund's true incentives, we would need
to know how the fund viewed the company's prospects in relation to
the rest of its portfolio, the prospects for raising a new fund with a new
portfolio of companies, and the fund managers' prospects for exiting the
venture capital business altogether.2 In short, it is one thing to observe
a pattern of conduct that sometimes results in shut-down of a viable
entity and quite another to infer from every disappointing transaction
that investors abandoned the company for greener pastures.
3. Indirect Evidence of Intent Is Difficult to Imagine
According to the preceding subparts, clear statements of intent and
industry-wide generalizations are the easy cases. The former is a compelling additional fact; the latter is not.
Between these easy cases are various forms of indirect or circumstantial evidence of opportunity-cost conflict. While it is hard to rule
out a compelling collection of indirect facts, it is hard to think of an
example that would not undermine the standard's purpose of meaningfully screening meritless litigation.
For example, Pretrial Trados emphasized that the company had
enjoyed some positive business developments. 2 9 In the year prior to the
sale, the company obtained additional debt financing and beat revenue
projections under the guidance of a new CEO that was selected by the
venture capital funds.23u But what do these signs of a possible upswing
really tell us? At most, they suggest Trados was not an altogether lost
225.

Id. at 671.

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 at *3,*14
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).

230. Id.
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cause, which is something we probably already knew from the fact that
a purchaser was willing to spend $60 million to buy the company.
Another influential fact in Trados was diminishing time
commitment by one of the allegedly conflicted directors. 21 This gets
closer to the gravamen of an opportunity-cost conflict-withdrawal of
effort from a fiduciary relationship in order to pursue better alternatives. There are at least two problems with focusing on reduced time
commitment, however.
First, it is unclear what the proper benchmark is for a board
member's time commitment. For example, it is plausible to think that,
when fully engaged, a board member affiliated with a venture capital
investor is more active than the average board member.232 Should that
board member then be held accountable for reducing involvement to
what might be more typical levels?
Second, if reduced effort alone is a qualifying additional fact, what
separates a Trados claim from a simple negligence (duty of care) claim
that would ordinarily be governed by the business judgment rule? It
may be inevitable that the line between care and loyalty occasionally
blurs.233 But given what is at stake when the court categorizes a claim
as sounding in loyalty or care, courts should be wary of too quickly
equating shirking with disloyalty. 34
Looking beyond Trados, what other type of facts, short of direct
evidence of intent, might qualify as other facts? In theory, a court could
draw inferences from a portfolio investor's or parent corporation's
internal valuations or assessments of alternatives. Such assessments
may suggest a prioritization of the fiduciary's efforts. But such reports
may be produced according to industry conventions that fail to capture
the fiduciary's subjective assessments. Managers of venture capital
funds, for example, provide their limited partners with periodic
estimates of portfolio-company values in accordance with agreed upon
2 5
valuation methods that may not reflect their subjective assessments.
So while it is difficult to rule out some combination of indirect
evidence that together makes a compelling case for an opportunity-cost
conflict, it is equally hard to think of a good example.

231. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 52 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(stating that one director stopped attending meetings in person).
232. See supra note 108 (describing the active involvement of venture capital

investors).
233. See supra notes 34-40 (discussing overlap between care and loyalty).
234. See supra notes 34-40 (exploring the conceptual differences between
claims arising out of care and claims arising out of loyalty).
235. See

ASSOCIATION FRANQAISE DES INVESTISSEURS EN CAPITAL ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL VALUATION

GUIDELINES

7 (2012);

see supra text accompanying

(discussing the subjective nature of opportunity costs).

notes 122-136
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POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

The first three parts of this article argued that courts should rarely
invoke Trados's novel theory of opportunity-cost conflicts, despite its
conceptual value. This Part anticipates objections and offers brief
responses.
A.

Opportunity-CostAnalysis Was Dicta in Trados

This article takes the position that opportunity-cost analysis was
integral to the court's selection of fairness review. It does so for several
reasons. First, that is a natural reading of the Trados opinion; why else
would the court engage in such elaborate and novel reasoning? Second,
the law has never required perfect incentive alignment, 36 and quasi37
residual rights go far in mitigating incentive distortion.
This is not the only plausible reading of Trados. One could read
the case to say that the mere ambiguity of quasi-residual incentives
triggers fairness review at the moderate downside. The court stated
that opportunity-cost conflicts "reinforce" incentives created by quasiresidual cash flow rights without explicitly indicating whether either
source of conflict alone is sufficient to trigger fairness review.23
Even if the opportunity-cost conflict was dicta in Trados, the
concept still warrants serious analysis. It is conceivable that future
plaintiffs will invoke the concept of opportunity-cost conflicts in other
contexts, such as an all common capital structure. 39 Eventually courts
may be called upon to assess whether an opportunity-cost conflict,
standing alone, is a viable claim. Put another way, sometimes dicta
matters because it foreshadows the future direction of the law. 40
B. Why Wasn't Trados Dismissed?
In Trados, the plaintiffs' best evidence was testimony of one
director at trial.2 41 In fact, it is not clear that any other evidence cited
in Trados was sufficient under the other-facts standard described in this
236. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102
237. See supraPart I.B.2 (discussing how conversion rights align incentives when

there is a meaningful chance at significant upside); supra Part I.B.3
(discussing how participation rights align incentives when there could be
moderate increases in enterprise value); supra Part IC (discussing the

largely aligned interests of common shareholders and venture-capital
investors); supra text accompanying notes 96-97 (discussing the limited
range of outcomes in which common and venture capital preferred conflict).
238. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 50 (Del. Ch. 2013).

239. See supra notes 1113-1124 and accompanying text.
240. Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dicta: The Default Duty in Delaware, 39 J.
CoRp. L. 35, 57-62 (2013) (discussing use of dicta by Delaware courts).

241. See supra note 1132.
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article. 242 How then did the plaintiffs' claims survive motion to dismiss
in Pretrial Trados?
In short, this article argues that the plaintiffs' claims should have
been dismissed contrary to the outcome of Pretrial Trados. Where did
Pretrial Trados go wrong? One possibility is that the court focused
only on the potential conflict between residual and quasi-residual cash
flow rights, contrary to the position articulated in Part IV.A above.
Alternatively, maybe the court implicitly relied on opportunity-cost
analysis and concluded there was sufficient indirect evidence of
improper intent, contrary to the analysis in Part III.C.3 above. In either
case, this article views Trados as a necessary improvement to the more
cursory reasoning of Pretrial Trados.
C. Contracting or Processing Around Trados
This article argues for a cautious approach to judicially enforced
fiduciary duties, primarily out of concern for litigation abuse.243 One
might argue that this caution is unnecessary because parties to financing transactions can follow ratification procedures (approval by independent directors) to cleanse any conflict or contract around Trados
through negotiated shareholder rights. 44 Bratton and Wachter, however, ably identify the difficulties preferred holders will encounter
contracting or processing around Trados.
Even if independent directors are reasonably available, 45 it will be
hard for those directors to conclude beyond litigation risk that a pivot
lacks significant value to the common holders to whom duties are

owed.246 As Bratton and Wachter note, even a fairness opinion that pegs
enterprise value well below the preferred liquidation preference probably must admit to some nontrivial chance at a turnaround.2 47 Under
Trados, such an opinion risks making the plaintiffs' case.24
242. See Part I.C.3 (discussing alleged indications of opportunity-cost conflict
in Trados and Pretrial Trados).

243. See supra Part III.C (suggesting that courts should scrutinize
opportunity-cost conflicts only in cases with extraordinary evidence); see
infra Part IV.A (suggesting that conflicts between the cash flow rights of
common and preferred are mild and should not trigger fairness review).
244. E.g., Strine, supra note 14, at 2040 (stating that Delaware's jurisprudence
relating to preferred stock "creates good incentives for parties with the
powerful leverage of preferred stockholders to get their rights where they
should-in the contract").
245. Trados's skepticism towards the supposedly independent director in that
case highlights the difficulty of the task. See supra Part III.C.2.
246. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1888-89 (discussing procedural
workarounds).
247. Id. at 1888.
248. Id.
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Ex ante contracts are no panacea either. Because an opportunitycost conflict sounds in loyalty rather than care, such a claim cannot be
released in the company's charter.2 49 Instead, the parties must rely on
less direct contractual solutions at the shareholder level.
A minority of venture capital financings include redemption rights
that amount to an eventual shutdown right in favor of the venture
capital investor. 25 This is an extremely blunt instrument-a nuclear
option at a date certain in favor of investors. With so much uncertainty
at the time of contracting, it is no wonder that such fixed time limits
for a venture are unpopular.
251
Drag-along rights are more common in venture capital financings.
Such rights permit a specified set of shareholders to compel other shareholders to vote in favor of a sale. 2 2 Though helpful in overcoming some
holdout problems, drag-along rights do not avoid the statutory requirements for board approval of a merger. 22 As a result, drag-along rights
24
cannot be exercised without exposing the board to Trados claims.
The foregoing contracting challenges are an additional reason-on
top of litigation abuse-for weaker fiduciary restraints. More rigorous
fiduciary review might foreclose governance structures to which entrepreneurs and investors might resort in the face of noncontractible problems. For example, Brian Broughman models how a customary board
configuration featuring an independent and mutually agreed upon
director as tie breaker can lead to optimal exit decisions. This result

249. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2015) (permitting elimination of
director liability for duty of care violations but not duty of loyalty violations).
250.

COOLEY LLP, 2014 VENTURE FINANCING IN REVIEW-A BANNER YEAR
FOR DEAL VOLUME AND INVESTED CAPITAL 7 (2015), http://www.cooley.

com/venture-financing-report-2014-year-in-review

[http://perma.cc/RE7N-

KT4Q].
251. Id. at 6.
252. See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 51, at 665-66 (discussing dragalong rights).
253. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (2015) (requiring board approval for a
merger).
254. In response to Pretrial Trados, Silicon Valley lawyers (acting through the
National Venture Capital Association) tried to enhance conventional dragalong rights by adding a contractual "sale right." Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 14, at 1892. The sale right requires the company to hire an investment
banker and conduct a sale process, and gives the exercising shareholders a
redemption right at the highest bid obtained. Id. But such a provision
necessarily falls short of compelling a sale--that would require board approval
and ensnare the directors in Trados analysis. As Bratton and Wachter note,
"[r]edemption in lieu of a merger is not the same as a merger." Id.
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obtains even if the directors act in self-interested ways that might
offend a more robust version of fiduciary loyalty.255
D. When Can a Board Pull the Plug?
If a venture-capital fund's opportunity costs are inappropriate
motivation for selling or shutting down a company, what would be an
appropriate motivation? Does Trados require a board to let a company
limp along indefinitely just to appease common-holding entrepreneurs?
Trados does not compel a board to prolong the life of a company
for the purpose of generating private benefits for entrepreneurs. Salary
and individual prestige may motivate entrepreneurs to continue even
when there is no meaningful chance of company value exceeding the
preferred holders' liquidation preference. In that circumstance, a board
(even one controlled by venture-capital investors) is justified in terminating the project over the entrepreneur's objections. Without smokinggun evidence of improper intent,256 a court should give deference to a
reasonably informed determination that common-stock value is near
zero.
E. Heightened Pleading Standards Haven't Worked
On its face, the other-facts standard resembles heightened pleading
standards such as those enacted by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 199557 (PLSRA) or mandated by recent judicial opinions
such as Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 5 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2" 9 Some
commentators question whether those reforms have been helpful in
distinguishing between meritless and valid claims.260

255. Broughman, supra note 106, at 480-86.
256. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing "direct evidence of intent").
257. The PSLRA enacted heightened pleading requirements, modified procedures

for selecting lead plaintiffs, and narrowed discovery rights in securities class
actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. I 1995-96).
258. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). There is some disagreement whether Twombly itself
constitutes a "heightened" pleading standard, but together with Iqbal the

current pleading regime is generally considered more demanding than what

preceded. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH L.
REV. 53, 65 (2010) ("The only study currently available of Twombly and Iqbal

together finds that dismissal rates have increased across the board .... ").
259. 556 U.S. 662 (2008).
260. E.g., Alex Reinert, The Cost of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119
(2011) (presenting an empirical analysis of the effects of Twombly and
Iqbal and concluding that the effects have been more random than meritbased); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 35 (2009)
(presenting evidence of PLSRA's effects and concluding, "Congress's
efforts to discourage frivolous litigation may have succeeded," but that
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Unlike a wide-ranging pleading hurdle, the other-facts standard
resides in a broader doctrinal context of review standards. If this system
of review standards works properly, litigants face additional hurdles
only with respect to fact patterns where risk of litigation abuse is likely
to outweigh risk of managerial abuse. For other fact patterns-where
there is ascertainable and heightened risk of managerial abuse-plaintiffs have easier access to courts. That is a different, and perhaps
more promising, approach than the PLSRA's or Twombley's broadly
applicable pleading hurdles. Put another way, the backdrop of
substantive law affects how pleading hurdles operate. 6
F. Plaintiffs Can Plead Anything

Tacking the other direction, one might view the other-facts
standard as too lenient. The standard does not require proving any
particular facts-just pleading them. What prevents a plaintiff from
manufacturing facts just to get over the pleading hurdle?26
Both ethics rules and rules of civil procedure require that a lawyer
have some basis for including facts in a complaint.263 While these may
be under-enforced requirements,264 changes in filing patterns before and

success comes at the price of "discouraging securities fraud class actions
that would likely have been deemed meritorious prior to the PSLRA").
261.

Cf. Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistenceof PleadingPractice,76
TEX. L. REV.1749, 1771 (1998) (providing examples of when substantive
elements of a tort or other claim might provide a framework for "tailored
scrutiny of the pleadings").

262. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1889 ("[N]othing prevents a
lawyer from drafting the same 'might have waited' complaint that survived
a motion to dismiss in Trados-maybe waiting a year would have yielded
$75 million. Such a claim is as hard to falsify as it is easy to draft.").
263. Ethical rules require that there be a basis in fact for any proceeding. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) ("A
lawyer shall not bring... a proceeding.., unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous."); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT.
r.3.1 (2003) (including language identical to the model rules). Rules of civil
procedure provide that every time a lawyer files a complaint he or she certifies
that "to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.., the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery." FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); See also DEL. CT. CH.
R. 11(b) (using similar language).
264. In particular, ethical standards regarding frivolous complaints appear to
be a rarely used tool. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil
Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
765, 795-797 (2004) (discussing the low frequency of disciplinary referrals
in connection with Rule 11 sanctions).
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after PSLRA, Twombly, and
Jqbal suggest that litigants are constrained
26 5
in what they can plead.
G. Fix Civil Procedure Instead

Concern about litigation abuse motivates this article's recommendations. In the long run, more squarely procedural reforms might be the
most effective way to balance the courts' interests in policing
managerial and litigation abuse. For example, civil-procedure scholars
have suggested reformulating the discovery system266 and corporate-law
scholars have proposed new standards for awarding attorneys fees to
discourage cosmetic settlements. 67
Nothing in this article precludes such reform. For now, courts have
to decide what to do with Trados's novel theory without the benefit of
those initiatives. This article advocates a cautious approach.
H. Entrepreneurs Don't Litigate Much

Some observers have noted an anti-litigation norm in Silicon
Valley. 66 In addition, some of the factors driving heightened concern
about litigation abuse might not apply in the context of a privately
held company with relatively few shareholders.269
But recent cases still evidence a willingness to bring suit against
venture capital investors.27 And many of the factors motivating
265. See supra note 260 (citing empirical analysis of heightened pleading
requirements).
266.

E.g., Dodson, supra note 258, at 68-85 (proposing discovery reforms tailored
to the new pleading regime, including circumscribed pre-suit investigative
discovery with cost-shifting mechanisms); see Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015
Civil Rules Package As Approved By the Judicial Conference, AM. BAR
Ass'N (March 11, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/litigation/materials/2015-sac/written materials/5_1_2015
_summary.of rule package.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GAXVSP4] (describing ongoing efforts at discovery reform by the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference).

267.

E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix
Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1, 46-59 (2015) (proposing changes to doctrines under which attorneys
are awarded fees for procuring a benefit for shareholders).

268. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator:
Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 679, 699-702 (1996).
269. For example, a more concentrated shareholder base may have an easier
time monitoring class counsel. See supra note 182 (discussing monitoring
problems in public company shareholder litigation).
270.

The following recent Delaware cases involve venture capital defendants:
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. 2014); In re Trados Inc.
S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound
Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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shareholder litigation do pertain in this context, including insurance
dynamics, the potential for hold-up value, and the disproportionate cost
to defendants of discovery.2 71 One might even project increased
litigation against venture capital funds in the near future, as investment
levels increase and stakes grow higher.2 72 Finally, though the concept of
opportunity-cost conflict emerged in the venture capital context, it is
not limited to that setting. 73
CONCLUSION

Decades ago, Melvin Eisenberg summarized the state of Delaware
fiduciary law as follows:
If directors or officers who violate the standards of reasonableness
and fairness sometimes escape liability because of a less demanding standard of review, it is not because they have acted properly,
but because utilizing standards of review that were fully congruent with the relevant standards of conduct would impose
greater costs than the costs of letting some 4persons who violated
2
their standards of conduct escape liability.
Most instances of opportunity-cost conflict are likely to fit the
pattern. Trados provides a coherent argument for why a fiduciary
should suppress the shut-down dynamic. But rooting out every transgression through litigation hardly seems worth the cost.

271.

See supra text accompany notes 179-184 (describing features of corporate

litigation that may contribute to litigation abuse).
272. See Lizette Chapman, 'Unicorn' Startups Say High Valuations Justified, Citing
Big Growth Ahead, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2015, 4:25 PM) http://blogs.
wsj.com/venturecapital/2015/05/07/unicorn-startups-say-high-valuations-

justified-citing-big-growth-ahead/ [http://perma.cc/5YZ9-N8CB] (providing
examples of venture-backed companies with pre-IPO valuations in excess of
$1 billion).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114 (providing examples of other
active investors likely to encounter opportunity-cost conflicts).
274. Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 467-68.

